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ABSTRACT 
 
Using household panel data for rural India covering the years 1993/94 and 2004/05, 
we test whether Scheduled Caste (SC) and other minority groups perform better or 
worse in terms of income when resident in villages dominated by (i) upper castes or 
(ii) their own group. Theoretically, upper caste dominance comprises a potential 
'proximity gain' and offsetting, group-specific 'oppression' effects. For SCs and OBCs, 
initial proximity gains dominate negative oppression effects because upper caste 
dominated villages are located in more productive areas: once agroecology is 
controlled for, proximity and oppression effects cancel each other out. Albeit 
theoretically ambiguous, we find large, positive own dominance or enclave effects for 
Upper Castes, OBCs and especially SCs. These village regime effects are restricted to 
the Hindu social groups. Combining pathway and income source analysis, we close in 
on the mechanisms underpinning identity-based income disparities; while education 
matters, land ownership accounts for most enclave effects.  A strong post reform SC 
own village advantage turns out to have agricultural rather than non-farm or business 
origins. We also find upper caste dominance to inhibit the educational progress of 
other social groups along with negative enclave effects on the educational progress of 
Muslim women and ST men.      
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I INTRODUCTION 
IA. Aim and motivation 
In economics, various mechanisms are recognized that, in a stratified society, 
link economic welfare with signifiers of social identity such as caste, religion and 
ethnicity. Some mechanisms originate in ‘taste-based’ (e.g. Becker 1971) or 
‘statistical’ (e.g. Arrow 1972) discrimination by others and are external to the affected 
group. Other mechanisms are internal and hinge on not how a group is seen and 
treated by others, but how its members perceive and interact among themselves. The 
consequences for economic performance of a self-image that group membership 
imparts (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) and of the onset of collective inertia (e.g. Peyton 
Young 2001) are two examples.  
In this paper we explore empirically the proposition that the balance of forces 
linking social identity to economic performance is influenced by the relative 
economic or political power of the various social groups that live and work in each 
other’s vicinity, to be precise, reside in the same village. We undertake this empirical 
inquiry for rural India, whose village communities can be seen as a paradigm of social 
stratification (e.g. Deshpande 2001 and 2011; Anderson 2011).  
We study three complementary explanations for identity-based disadvantage. 
The first, the oppression hypothesis, originates in M. N. Srinivas’s theory of caste 
dominance
1
  which portrays a caste that apart from strong numerical presence is also 
economically powerful (Srinivas 1955). The oppression hypothesis captures the 
external mechanisms linking social identity and economic welfare and suggests that 
historically disadvantaged and other marginalised social groups fare worse when 
resident in villages dominated by upper castes.  
 4 
The second, the village enclave hypothesis, corresponds with the internal 
mechanisms linking identity and welfare, is theoretically ambiguous and depicts a 
situation where a marginalised group is dominant at the village level. Upwards 
mobility may then be inhibited, or conversely encouraged, by factors internal to the 
group in question. To illustrate, the absence of role models or a preference for 
traditional occupations could lock individuals of marginalised backgrounds into low 
level equilibrium traps (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). By reducing the social distance 
between parties to rural transactions, own enclaves could also improve the operation 
of vital rural markets (Anderson 2011).  
Thirdly, we evaluate the merit of the proximity hypothesis, which is anchored in 
a theory of public goods provision and suggests that minority groups may benefit 
from being proximate to politically well-connected and prosperous upper castes (e.g. 
Sethi and Somanathan 2010). We explain why proximity and oppression provide 
complementary insights about the roots of caste-based disparities in rural India. 
Our paper adds a timely political economy dimension and new empirical 
insights to the literature addressing identity, economic disadvantage and its 
persistence.  Existing studies linking economic performance to the village level 
balance of power are few and Anderson (2011) is the only other comprehensive effort.          
Pertaining to India and in spite of bold legislation that made reservations of 
government jobs and seats in legislative assemblies and educational institutions a  
hallmark policy, households of Scheduled Caste
2
  (former ‘untouchables’) and 
Scheduled (indigenous) Tribe backgrounds continue to feature disproportionately on 
key indicators of rural deprivation.
3
 This persistence remains a puzzle that we attempt 
to shed new light on.    
 5 
Finally, India’s so-called ‘silent revolution’ manifested in the rapid rise in lower 
caste representation in state-level legislative assemblies (Jaffrelot 2003), suggests that 
a key ingredient for social change already is in place. Banerjee and Somanathan’s 
(2007) study of parliamentary constituencies and rural infrastructure provision 
between 1971 and 1991 supports this view since social groups that politically 
mobilised, namely Scheduled Castes, appear to have leaped forward relative to those 
that did not  (Scheduled Tribes and Muslims).   
We see two reasons for questioning the growing optimism about the remedial 
and transformative potential of the democratic process whether on its own or aided by 
political reservations (e.g. Pande 2003). Firstly, the data used in previous studies are 
too coarse to undertake the necessary welfare and poverty comparisons: village 
variables do not adequately account for (infrastructure) quality variation while state 
level expenditure and other variables do not capture benefit incidence and the 
magnitudes of improvements in enough depth. The second is the analytical bypass of 
village level institutional hurdles to social change. With the emergence of a new, rich 
dataset described in detail below, we aim to remedy this neglect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IB. Background and contribution to the literature 
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‘March 1949: A group of Scheduled Caste members from villages around Delhi had 
been thrown out of their homes by Jat landowners angered that these previously 
bonded servants had the cheek to take part in local elections and graze their cattle on 
the village commons.   
June 1951: A village in Himachal Pradesh. A conference of Scheduled Castes is 
attacked by Rajput landlords. The SCs are beaten up with sticks, their leaders tied up 
with ropes and confined to a cattle pound.  
June 1952: A village in the Madurai district of Madras State. A SC youth asks for tea 
in a glass at a local shop. Tradition entitles him only to a disposable coconut shell. 
When he persists, he is kicked and hit on the head by caste Hindus.   
June 1957: A village in the Parbani district of Madhya Bharat. Newly converted 
Buddhists [previously “untouchable” Hindus] refuse to flay carcasses of dead cattle. 
They are boycotted by the Hindu landlords, denied other work and threatened with 
physical reprisals.’   (Guha 2007, 380-81)  
 
More than 50 years later and in spite of a weakening of the more forbidding caste 
barriers
4
, Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) households remain 
overrepresented among India’s rural poor, illiterate and in the former case, also the 
landless.
 
While rural poverty is declining, these two groups, which represent 16.2 
(SC) and 8.2 (ST) percent of the country’s population,5 account for 47.3 percent of 
India’s rural poor (Gang et al. 2008a). A less sharply delineated category of 
disadvantaged citizens mentioned by the Constitution, Other Backward Classes 
(OBC), also continues to have lower living standards than the mainstream population 
(Gang et al. 2008b).
6
 The results reported below suggest that the same holds for 
 7 
Muslims, the largest religious minority accounting for 13.4 percent of the population 
(Census of India 2001). 
Shah et al.’s (2006) study of untouchability, covering 550 villages in 11 main 
states, found that SCs were prevented from full participation in local markets and 
often from entering village shops in 30-40 percent of the villages surveyed; in 45-50 
percent of these villages, SCs were prevented from selling milk to village dairy 
cooperatives. Such ‘bans’ are rooted in purity and pollution ideals and the ensuing and 
sensitive links between a person’s caste and the preparation and handling of food and 
water (e.g. Madsen 1991, Iversen and Raghavendra 2006). Indeed, and well known, 
SC hamlets tend to be separate from the main village and often have their own 
drinking water source.
7
 
We test our hypotheses by examining the relationship between the social 
identity of the groups that are economically or numerically dominant at the village 
level and the income of households belonging to marginalised groups advancing the 
literature as follows. Firstly, a few studies test for identity-based disadvantage in India 
(e.g. Kijima 2006; Gang et al. 2008a), but do not test whether village level upper caste 
or own group dominance affect economic performance.
8
 In addition, little remains 
known about whether and in what directions, patterns, magnitudes and causes of 
identity-based disadvantage have transmuted during the post reform years. 
Secondly, we broaden the remit of empirical research on identity aspects of 
economic performance. In India, empirical research on caste has focused mainly on 
labour market discrimination (e.g. Banerjee and Knight 1985; Kingdon 1998; Thorat 
and Attewell 2007). Evidence suggests that individuals of SC and ST background are 
indeed  disadvantaged  – through lower wages, a higher propensity of being stuck in 
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dead end jobs (e.g. Banerjee and Knight 1985) or inferior employment terms, such as 
casual employment (e.g. Madeshwaran and Attewell 2007).
9
       
To date, much anecdotal but little systematic knowledge exists about 
discrimination in credit, insurance or other key markets or particular to rural areas, 
markets for agricultural inputs and outputs. There is also limited evidence on whether 
caste, religious or tribal identity circumscribes the access to poverty-oriented public 
policy programmes or public services in general.
10 
 
Thirdly, we provide a major push forward of the empirical literature using 
sociological and anthropological notions of caste dominance where Anderson (2011) 
is the other main contributor. For a data-set covering 120 villages in Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar, she observes that Yadav households in villages where Yadavs are the 
dominant land owners have higher incomes than Yadav households in villages where 
the dominant land owners belong to a local upper caste. Anderson attributes this result 
to the market for irrigation water’s failure to operate in villages with upper caste land 
dominance and concludes that social distance may prevent the efficient operation of 
vital rural markets. 
Unlike Anderson (2011), we distinguish first theoretically and then in our 
empirical specifications, to the extent that these specifications allow,  between the 
potential ‘proximity gain’ for Scheduled Castes and other social groups from residing 
in upper caste dominated villages and offsetting, social group specific, oppression 
effects within the same villages. In the light of Sethi and Somanathan (2010) this 
distinction is crucial for obtaining a balanced understanding of the origins of caste-
based disparities in rural India. 
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IC. Empirical strategy and main findings 
We use a unique household panel data set for rural India to make detailed standard of 
living comparisons across social groups at two points in time – before the effects of 
the 1991 liberalisation reforms had started to kick in (1993/94; round 1),
 11
  and 11 
years later (2004/05; round 2).  We exploit our access to uniquely detailed 
information on the largest landowning and population groups in villages where panel 
households reside to explore three possible, complementary explanations for identity-
based disadvantage in rural India. 
We identify the effects on household income of belonging to a particular social 
group, of belonging to a particular social group and living in a village dominated by 
upper castes and ditto but living in a village dominated by one’s own group (the 
‘enclave’ effect). The effect of living in an upper caste dominated village represents 
the net of the ‘oppression’ and the ‘proximity’ effect (regardless of which group one 
belongs to). The proximity effect captures the idea that upper castes are likely to be 
prosperous, politically well-connected, and able to ensure better access to rural 
infrastructure and other public goods.
 12
  In our main regression specification, we first 
condition on the state of residence and agro-ecology at the district level and proceed 
to control for contemporaneous household and village level characteristics.  
In upper caste dominated villages, we initially find that proximity gains 
dominate oppression effects for OBCs and SCs: this is not, as others have suggested, 
because of a better access to village public goods but because such villages are 
located in more productive areas. Once agroecology is controlled for, this net gain 
disappears and proximity and oppression effects cancel each other out.  
We do, moreover, find large, positive own dominance or enclave effects on 
income for UCs, OBCs and especially for SCs in the post reform era. A striking 
 10 
finding is that these village regime effects on income are confined to the Hindu social 
groups in our panel. We also find upper caste dominance to inhibit the educational 
progress of other social groups and negative own enclave effects on the educational 
progress of Muslim women and Schedule Tribe men.    
 We use the estimated coefficients in our main specification to compute 
counterfactual income and poverty figures. Upper caste dominance brings an own-
group advantage of about 10 percent of mean income in both survey rounds. Even if 
other groups benefited as much as UCs from a positive externality conferred on them, 
this proximity gain is more than offset by group specific ‘oppression’ effects for SC 
and OBC households, which in round 2 depress mean income of SC and OBC 
households in upper caste (UC) dominated villages by, respectively, about 14 and 12 
percent and raise the percentage in poverty by, respectively, 6 and 5 points. Although 
the second effect is larger, the net effect of proximity and oppression is, as noted 
above, statistically insignificant after controlling for agroecology and state of 
residence.  
We confirm robustness of our main results to how dominance is measured: 
whether as a zero/one variable, which we prefer for parsimony and ease of 
interpretation, or as the share of village land held by the dominant group, or as a 
dominance-adjusted Herfindahl index capturing that if land holdings among the non-
dominant groups are more fragmented, the intensity of the largest group’s dominance 
should be expected to increase. 
Finally, we combine pathway and income source analysis to explore the 
mechanisms through which these village regime effects manifest themselves. 
Pathways are explored by gradually introducing sets of variables that capture village 
infrastructure, household education and household land. It transpires that village 
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infrastructure has no, education negligible and land the largest such effect: once all 
three are controlled for, virtually no village regime effects remain. A key insight from 
the income source analysis is that the resilient SC round 2 enclave effect has 
agricultural and not, as perhaps expected, non-farm or business roots.  
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the data set, elaborates on 
the theoretical background and presents the empirical model for testing our 
hypotheses. Section III presents descriptive statistics on income and poverty levels 
and change and on human capital endowments by social group and village regime. 
Section IV presents the main empirical results, followed by robustness tests, and a 
computation of counterfactual income, growth and poverty to illustrate the order of 
magnitude of the village regime effects that we identify. Section V concludes.   
 
II. DATA, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
IIA. The data set 
 
The data are from two large-scale household surveys that cover most of the 
territory of India, the earlier known as the Human Development Profile of India 
(HDPI) surveys, and the later as the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS). The 
first round, HDPI-I (1993/94), was carried out by the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) on behalf of UNDP. The second round, HDPI-II IHDS 
(2004/05), was carried out by NCAER on behalf of the University of Maryland. The 
primary purpose of the surveys was to collect detailed information on a large range of 
human development indicators, including income, the variable reported on here. 
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These surveys are the first major ones for India to measure household income in a 
comprehensive and refined manner, including carefully assessed income from 
cultivation, self-employment and a large number of other sources (Desai et al. 2009; 
16).
13
  
The way in which data on income is collected in both rounds is identical or 
similar for all sources with the exception of crops. At the national level, the figures 
suggest an annual rural income per capita growth of 4.2 percent, a poverty headcount 
ratio of 38.3 percent for 1993/94, and of 29.0 percent for 2004/05. These figures are 
very close to estimates of the incidence and decline of rural poverty in India based on 
the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
(CES), despite the use of expenditures, not income in the latter. According to the 50th 
NSSO CES (1993/94) 37.1 percent of the rural population were in poverty; in the 61st 
round (2004/05) rural poverty stood at 28.4 percent.
14
  
A unique feature of these data is that a village questionnaire was administered in 
the second round and enables the construction of village social composition and land 
ownership distribution variables by jati (sub-caste). Further, the sub-division of social 
groups in the household questionnaires allows us
 
to precisely identify the jati of 
individual households and thus to make comparisons of the economic performance of 
other social groups with that of upper-caste households, who mostly are Hindus.
15
 
These features depart notably from official data sets with collection of information on 
jati terminated after the 1931 Census. 
The first round of the survey used a random sample of households located in and 
representative of each of the rural areas in all (then sixteen) India’s major states. The 
attrition rate between the two rounds is 18 percent, and due to recontact details not 
being available in two states,
16
 and migration (of the entire household) and natural 
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demise (Desai et al. 2009; 3). After removing about 20 villages with missing social 
composition and land ownership information, our panel comprises of 9,108 
households spread over 679 villages.   
Since a residence-based sampling rule was adopted, the findings reported here 
are strictly speaking valid only for households who choose not to migrate (e.g. Baulch 
and Hoddinott 2000; Rosenzweig 2003). However, the comparison of living standards 
and changes therein across social groups – the focus of this paper – should not be 
much affected by this limitation: the variables caste, religion, education and income 
are not substantially different in the panel from those in a randomly selected rural 
refresher sample drawn to check the round 2 representativeness of the panel 
household sample.
17
  Furthermore, we performed a statistical test on whether or not 
the inclusion in the panel of all households who participated in the first round is 
associated with our dependent variable household income. After controlling for 
household demographic composition and educational attainment, household income is 
not associated with selection into the panel,
18
 suggesting no endogenous panel 
attrition and that our panel households, with respect to income, are a randomly 
selected subsample of all rural households that participated in the first round. 
 
 
IIB. Upper caste and own dominance – theory and definitions 
 
The caste dominance concept originates in the sociological and anthropological 
literature.  In Srinivas’s (1955, 18) own words:  
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‘A caste may be said to be ‘dominant’ when it preponderates numerically over 
the other castes and when it wields preponderant economic and political power. A 
large and powerful caste group can more easily be dominant if its position in the 
local hierarchy is not too low.’  
 
Upper caste dominance is perhaps best expressed as a combination of secular 
power and ritual status where the latter reflects the Varna hierarchical order with 
Brahmins topmost among four broad occupational ranks and with former 
untouchables (SCs) as a separate category. The dominant social group could be 
defined as the group (i) which represents a larger share of the village population than 
any other social group (nd); (ii) owning more village land than any other social group 
(ld) (e.g. Dumont 1970); or (iii) both nd and ld (e.g. Srinivas 1955). While not 
exhaustive, (i)-(iii) are alternative measures of secular power.  
Numerical strength could translate into village level political muscle especially 
after the 73
rd
 Constitutional Amendment’s elevation of the status and significance of 
village Panchayats. However, Anderson (2011) finds no effects of population 
dominance on economic outcomes. As explained below, our empirical focus on land 
dominance partly reflects a constraint imposed by de facto village structures in rural 
India but also exploratory regressions supportive of Anderson’s (2011) observations  
and Dumont’s (1970) assertion that dominance is rooted in economic power captured 
by landownership alone.
19
      
Conceptually, let the land of village j, Lj, be distributed over m groups where ni 
represents the share of the village land that belongs to social group i. Hence,   
1
1
m
j i
i
L n

                          (1) 
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Definitions: A dominant social group has the largest share of the village land of any 
social group. For members of the dominant social group in village j, village j is own 
group dominated or an own enclave. If the dominant social group in village j is upper 
caste, village j is upper caste dominated. Upper caste dominance exemplifies a village 
regime.         
 
This forms the conceptual backbone for the main analysis with our preferred 
dominance measure being sociologically anchored and easy to interpret. This 
preferred measure neglects the relative size of the dominant group’s landholdings, as 
well as fragmentation or concentration among other social groups within a village. 
We therefore make use of two alternative dominance measures as robustness checks. 
The first is the share of village land owned by the dominant group, the second a 
modified Herfindahl index. 
The Herfindahl index of concentration for village j may be defined as:  
 
2
1
m
j i
i
H n

  where    0,1jH                              (2) 
Situations where two groups have landholdings of equal size would imply  
considerable concentration, but  not dominance. To equip Hj to capture dominance, 
we introduce the following modification:       
2 2
j d i
i d
D n n

                                      
(3) 
where nd  is the land share owned by the dominant group. For a given nd, the more 
fragmented is the land ownership of other groups, the higher is Dj. In the example 
above, the value of Dj will be exactly zero, as it should be. 
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To construct village level dominance measures, we combine village level 
information on social structure and land ownership with evidence on the hierarchical 
status of precisely identified jatis. The village questionnaire administered in round 2 
identifies the jati of the numerically dominant social group in each village, the 
percentage of village land this social group owns along with similar information for 
the next 4-8 most numerous social groups. Anthropological and other relevant 
evidence (e.g. Jaffrelot 2003) on the status of different jatis is then invoked to develop 
a more refined upper caste definition as explained in Appendix 1. Given the general 
inactivity of rural land markets
20
 and that land-dominant groups typically hold a much 
larger share of village land than any other group,
21
 we assume that the village regime 
is identical in rounds 1 and 2.  
IIC. Empirical model 
The proximity, oppression and enclave hypotheses refer to the extent to which 
the income level of households from different social groups is affected by the social 
identity of the dominant land owners in the village of residence. To test these 
hypotheses, we model the relative differences in income by social group and village 
regime, controlling for location and household characteristics, as follows (see  
Appendix 3 for more details): 
 
 0 1 2 3 4ln( )ht t t h t h t h t hY SC ST MUS OBC             
1 ( ) 2 ( )t h v h t h v hSC DSC ST DST      
  3 ( ) 4 ( )t h v h t h v hMUS DMUS OBC DOBC      
  5 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( )t h v h t h v h t h v hUC DUC SC DUC ST DUC          
  3 ( ) 4 ( )t h v h t h v hMUS DUC OBC DUC      
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( )t ht h v h htX       ,                  (4) 
 
Subscript h denotes households, t time (t={1993/94,2004/05}) and ν(h) the village of 
residence of  household h. Household real per capita income 
22
 is denoted by Y and 
the five social groups a household can belong to are denoted by SC (Scheduled 
Castes), ST (Scheduled Tribes), MUS (Muslims), OBC (Other Backward Classes) and 
UC (Upper Caste). These are all dummy variables and take the value 1 if a household 
belongs to this group and 0 otherwise. The village regime is modeled using the 
dummy variables DSC, DST, DMUS, DOBC and DUC, which take the value 1 if this 
particular social group is land dominant in the village of residence and 0 otherwise.  
The last three right hand side terms of equation (4) form the error structure of 
the model. The first two error terms are, respectively, a random household specific 
effect, θh, that is assumed to be independently distributed across households, and a 
random village specific effect, ηv(h), which is assumed to be independently distributed 
across villages. The third error term, εht, is an idiosyncratic error term and is assumed 
to be independently distributed across households, villages and time. The assumption 
of a random household specific effect, as opposed to a fixed effect, is required 
because incorporating a household specific fixed effect would make it impossible to 
identify proximity, oppression and enclave effects since the village regime is constant 
over time and panel households live in the same village in both rounds. We estimate 
equation (4) by Least Squares separately for each round and thus allow all parameters 
to vary over time. Arbitrary correlation between households within a village is 
accounted for when calculating the standard errors (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
The α-parameters refer to the relative income differences between households of 
different social groups with UC as reference group. For instance, the parameter α1t 
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(x100) corresponding to the variable SC, is interpreted as the percentage difference in 
income between SC and UC households living in a village dominated neither by SC  
nor by UC (ceteris paribus).  
The enclave hypothesis refers to the β-parameters. For instance, the parameter 
β1t (x100) corresponding to the variable SCxDSC represents  the percentage difference 
in income between SC households living in a village dominated by their own social 
group and SC households living in a village dominated neither by SC nor by UC.  
Further, the parameter 5 (x100) corresponding to the variable UCxDUC is 
interpreted as the percentage difference in income between UC households living in a 
UC dominated village and UC households living in a village not dominated by UC. 
γ1, 
corresponding to the variable SCxDUC, for instance, is interpreted as the percentage 
difference in income between SC households living in a UC dominated village and 
SC households living in a village dominated by neither SC nor UC.  
In order to disentangle proximity and oppression effects, we use estimated 
coefficients to compute counterfactual income as if the externality conferred upon 
other social groups from living in a UC-dominated village is equal to the UC own 
enclave effect. That is, we assume that the proximity gain for non-UC households is 
(at most) equal to the UC enclave effect.  In practice it is possible  that the externality 
that causes this proximity effect is smaller, so in doing so we provide an upperbound  
on the (absolute) oppression effects.
23
 See the appendix for details. 
Following Anderson (2011), who contends that land holding patterns in village 
India are historically determined, our village regime variables are assumed to be 
exogenous determinants of (per capita) household income. To the extent that 
contemporaneous village-level and household-level characteristics such as village 
 19 
infrastructure, household land and education are correlated with village regime, it is 
legitimate to think of these as pathways along which the village regime affects 
household income. This leaves open the possibility that land holding patterns are 
historically and jointly determined with land quality. For instance, if UCs, on average, 
were more successful in the scramble for fertile land, the proximity coefficient could 
simply pick up that upper caste dominated villages are located in areas with greater 
agricultural potential.
24
 In addition, land reforms, which fell within the jurisdiction of 
individual states after independence, could have upset the historical land ownership 
patterns that Anderson’s identification strategy relies upon. However, and as Besley 
and Burgess (2000) document, while state level legislation included introducing land 
ceilings, redistribution of land has, by and large, been evaded because of loopholes 
and the absence of political commitment (ibid. 394).
25
 The most powerful effects on 
poverty have instead been observed for reforms strengthening tenurial security 
(ibid.).
26
  
To address these two concerns which may cause a violation of our assumption 
of exogenous village regime variables, we use Palmer-Jones and Sen’s (2003) 
mapping of agroecological zones onto Indian districts
27
 and state dummy variables as 
additional controls. Both sets of variables are included in the vector of control 
variables (X) in equation (4). X also includes variables for household demographic 
composition, education and land holdings, and for village infrastructure (the full 
variable list is reported in Appendix 2). 
As noted, all parameters of equation (4) are allowed to vary with time which 
makes it possible to investigate changes in enclave effects and obtain clues about 
changes in proximity and oppression effects between the two rounds and in turn the 
implications for income growth and for poverty incidence and persistence. As 
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discussed we explore the robustness of the main results to two alternative measures of 
dominance and for this purpose we replace the dummy dominance variables (e.g. 
DUC) with the upper caste land share (the first alternative) or the value of the 
dominance adjusted Herfindahl-index (the second alternative, eq. (3)).    
        
 
 
 
III.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
Anchored in Dumont’s (1970) conception of caste dominance, as set out above, our 
empirical focus is on villages where a particular social group owns the largest 
proportion of village land. The technical challenge posed by separate identification of 
land and population dominance is discernible from the diagonal of Table I which 
shows the strong correlation between  population and land dominance:  for each social 
group, if it is population dominant, in over 90 percent of cases, it is also land 
dominant, and vice versa. Table I shows that Upper Caste dominance is the most 
common village regime, closely followed by villages dominated by OBCs. The 
number of SC and Muslim dominated villages is comparatively small.       
 [Insert table I about here] 
 
Table II reports the distribution of households across village regimes and 
illustrates the extent to which households are clustered in ‘own’ dominated villages. 
Such clustering, which can be read off the bold diagonal, is pronounced for STs, UCs, 
OBCs and Muslims while the SC population is more dispersed. Relevant to the 
 21 
oppression hypothesis, table II also shows the presence of households from each 
social group in UC-dominated villages. 45.9 percent of the households residing in 
such villages are UCs, 26.4 percent SCs and 21.6 percent OBCs. STs and Muslims 
between them account for 6.1 percent.  
 
 
 [Insert table II about here] 
 
 
Next, we present descriptive statistics on village regimes that are pertinent to the 
proximity, oppression and enclave hypotheses.
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 Figure 1 reports round 1 and round 2 
mean household per capita incomes and poverty headcount by social groups for 
villages with (i) upper caste land dominance, (ii) own group land dominance and (iii) 
the remaining ‘other’ villages. Unsurprisingly, in the aggregate, SCs and STs are on 
average worse off than OBCs and Muslims, who are in turn poorer than UCs, which is 
true in both rounds and whether measured by income or poverty incidence. However, 
a more nuanced picture is obtained once we compare living standards by social group 
across village regimes. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 suggests pronounced village regime effects on income levels, growth, 
poverty incidence and the speed of poverty reduction (or conversely, poverty 
persistence). In round 1, SCs and OBCs in upper caste dominated villages have 
marginally higher average incomes. For STs, round 1 incomes outside own enclaves 
were notably higher. The average upper caste household was much better off in own 
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enclaves, while Muslim incomes show little variation across village regimes. In terms 
of how income by social group ranks across village regimes, the second round picture 
is broadly similar to that of the first round for OBCs, Muslims and UCs but strikingly 
different for STs and SCs: STs in round 2 appear to do much better in UC dominated 
villages while SCs fared much better in own enclaves. 
In terms of average living standard improvements, enclaves seem to favour UCs 
and SCs very strongly and Muslims marginally; STs did remarkably well in UC 
dominated villages, but made little progress overall. Contrasting this dynamism, SCs 
and OBCs in upper caste dominated villages and STs and OBCs in own enclaves 
experienced little progress between the rounds. 
Were these average income changes confined to the better off or did they extend 
to poorer households as well?  In the first round, the incidence of poverty among SCs, 
STs, OBCs and Muslims was lower in upper caste dominated villages than in own 
enclaves. Consistent with the income growth observations, the most dramatic poverty 
reductions appear for SCs in own enclaves and STs in upper caste dominated villages. 
However, in spite of modest income rises, poverty reduction among Muslims in own 
enclaves looks dramatic. Poorer ST households made slightly more progress than the 
average ST household. Consistent with the income figures, OBCs seem to have 
experienced limited poverty reduction between the two rounds.  
Figure 2 illustrates how social identity interacted with village regime relate to 
one important factor endowments in rural India, namely basic education as measured 
by male and female illiteracy. 
 [Insert figure 2 about here] 
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       For both male and female literacy, SCs and OBCs do better in their own enclaves 
than in UC-dominated villages and Muslims worse, in both survey rounds. No such 
clear pattern is discernible for STs. Among groups with low initial male literacy (SCs, 
STs, Muslims), we observe across the board improvements with Muslims and STs in 
own enclaves progressing more than those in UC dominated villages. SCs had higher 
and Muslims lower initial male literacy in their own enclaves. Although these 
observations on educational levels and progress correspond imperfectly with the 
income and growth patterns in Figure 1, they do provide hints of positive enclave 
level and growth effects for SCs. While STs in UC dominated villages experienced 
rapid income growth, male education does not appear to be responsible for this spur. 
Female STs experienced dramatic educational progress in general, while female SCs 
did better and female Muslims worse in own enclaves.      
To sum up, in terms of the level of income and poverty in both rounds, as well 
as income growth and poverty reduction, UCs and STs do on average better in UC-
dominated villages than anywhere else. By contrast, SCs in their own enclaves do not, 
on average, outperform SCs elsewhere in terms of income and poverty in round 1, but 
do so and apparently very strongly in round 2. Excepting poverty reduction (but not 
mean income growth) of Muslims in their own enclaves, the differences across village 
regimes for Muslims and OBCs are small. Some factor endowments – most notably 
SC literacy rates in SC-dominated are consistent with these patterns, but observations 
so far are inconclusive about how village regimes affect household welfare. We next 
implement the empirical strategy laid out in section II. 
         
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
IVA. Estimation results 
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Eq. (4) is estimated for round 1 and 2 using alternative specifications where extra 
variables are gradually introduced, a first set primarily to ensure that key effects of 
interest are not locationally confounded, and a next set to investigate pathways 
through which enclave, proximity and oppression effects operate. The estimation 
results for these specifications are reported in Tables III and IV and in full in 
Appendix 2. The natural logarithm of real household income per capita is the 
dependent variable.  
The first specification contains social identity dummy variables (SC, ST, MUS, 
OBC) with upper castes as benchmark category. We add the enclave village regime 
variables capturing own group land dominance (SCxDSC, STxDST, MUSxDMUS 
and OBCxDOBC), the enclave effect for upper castes (UCxDUC) and, finally, the 
social group interaction terms with upper caste dominance (SCxDUC,STxDUC, 
MUSxDUC and OBCxDUC). These latter interactions facilitate identification of how 
SCs, Muslims and OBCs perform within upper caste dominated compared to own 
enclaves and to the ‘benchmark’ other villages with the latter captured by the ‘raw’ 
social identity terms.   
 
 [Insert table III about here] 
 
 
 
Table III is laid out to facilitate round 1 and round 2 comparisons. We discuss 
the enclave, proximity and oppression effects before and after introducing locational 
and demographic controls and proceed to address the pathways through which each of 
these effects operate.
29
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In columns (1) and (2) we interact the village regime variables with households’ 
social group, first without and then with control variables added. Prior to adding agro-
ecological, state and household demographic controls, it appears that residing in an 
upper caste dominated village not only benefits upper caste households, as suggested 
by the large (and significant at the 1 % level) UC enclave coefficient (UC x DUC), 
but also bestows sizeable benefits on OBC and SC households. The UC enclave 
coefficient leaps notably in size between the two rounds, but only before controls are 
added.  
Starting with round 1 and prior to adding controls, it is evident that UC 
households do better than everyone else, irrespective of location, and do particularly 
well in UC dominated villages. OBCs do better than SCs and marginally better than 
STs and Muslims outside, but much better than STs and Muslims if resident in UC 
dominated or in OBC enclaves. In fact, OBCs are the only group that do not lose out 
relative to UCs in UC dominated villages. For SCs, a significant but smaller gain from 
residing in UC dominated villages is observed. We interpret the positive interaction 
terms for OBCs and SCs as the difference between positive proximity and negative 
oppression effects. In this first specification, the former dominate the latter.       
Turning to the post-liberalisation era, we first register a general widening of 
identity-based disparities in favour of upper caste households. The UC enclave effect 
is larger and consistent with the descriptive statistics, STs do much better in UC 
dominated villages than anywhere else, while Muslims do better in their own enclaves 
(weakly significant coefficient). There is, moreover, a large and strongly positive SC 
enclave effect. While SCs benefitted from proximity to UCs before the reform effects 
started to kick in, SCs in own enclaves appear to have made significantly more 
progress during the post reform era.
30
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We next investigate whether the above effects are locationally confounded. UC 
dominated villages might be clustered in areas with greater agricultural potential and 
SC dominated villages in states with more progressive policies towards Scheduled 
Castes or in states that experienced more (or less) income growth and poverty 
reduction in the aftermath of the 1991 reforms; the locational disadvantage of ST 
dominated villages was remarked upon above. 
We add three sets of controls and note that, in contrast to state dummies, the 
main changes occur when agro-ecological zone controls are introduced.  Adding 
Palmer-Jones and Sen’s (2003) mapping of agro-ecological zones onto Indian districts 
makes clear that location matters.     
The results reported in column 2 show that the UC enclave coefficient sizes are 
sharply reduced in both rounds. Further, the interaction terms capturing OBC and SC 
residence in UC dominated villages turn insignificant. In contrast, the OBC enclave 
coefficients remain significant (shrinks in size in round 1), while the SC enclave 
coefficients are now significant in both rounds. The SC enclave effect remains 
statistically stronger and of a much larger order of magnitude in round 2. Unlike for 
the three broad Hindu groups, there are no discernible village regime effects for STs 
and Muslims.   
            A key insight so far is that the proximity hypothesis has merit but that the 
proximity gains for OBCs (but see below) and SCs (and STs in round 2) are all 
locationally confounded – once we control for location, the proximity and oppression 
effects for OBCs and SCs cancel each other out.     
The main enclave coefficients are not, it turns out, locationally confounded. 
OBCs do better in their own enclaves in both rounds, while SCs do far better in their 
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own enclaves in both rounds but particularly in round 2. However, the weaker round 2 
enclave effect for Muslims turns insignificant. 
The precise implications of the proximity gain and of the oppression and 
enclave effects for income levels, growth, poverty incidence and poverty persistence 
are illustrated in the computations of counterfactual income, growth and poverty in 
subsection C below.  
Our results so far suggest positive and significant enclave effects for UCs, OBCs 
and SCs in both rounds and no village regime effects for the other two groups. Once 
we control for location the OBC and SC net proximity gains that we observed to start 
with are wiped out.  Put differently, the Hindu social groups benefit from the 
dominance of ‘their own kind’ in the village communities where they reside.31,32     
We next shift the analytical attention to the underlying processes at work and 
first study the pathways through which village regime effects operate and possible 
change between the rounds. We gradually control for village infrastructure, household 
education and household land holdings with results for the two latter reported in table 
IV.  
 
 [Insert table IV about here] 
 
Following Kijima (2006), we introduce dummies for the maximum female and 
male education within a household where the educational categories are up to 
primary, middle, matriculation, higher secondary and graduate plus. A hypothesis 
resonating with Dercon and Krishnan’s (2007) findings would be that social identity 
disparities – by caste, religion or tribe – should evaporate once educational 
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attainments are controlled for. The results reported in column 1, table IV include 
controls for village infrastructure and education.
 33
    
For both rounds, we observe a marked reduction in the raw identity coefficients 
(see Appendix 2) and thus in the relative disadvantage of SCs, STs, Muslims and 
OBCs from adding educational controls. For STs, the raw coefficient drops from -
0.31 to -0.17 or by around 45 percent. For SCs, in comparison, education nets out 
about 33 percent of the remaining disadvantage vis-à-vis upper caste households. Our 
results concur with Dercon and Krishnan (2007) in suggesting that education is 
crucial: it is evident from the table, however, that education is only part of the 
solution.  
Turning to the village regime effects, we observe a marginal weakening of the 
enclave effects for OBCs with the round 2 coefficient turning insignificant and the t-
value for the round 1 coefficient slightly reduced. Overall, therefore, education 
sharply reduces the raw identity coefficients while leaving the village regime effects 
largely intact.     
We next consider land holdings as potential oppression buffer or asset that may 
bolster enclave advantage. Starting with the raw identity terms, it is evident that 
controlling for household land further and substantially reduces the disadvantage of 
SCs and Muslims, while the effect on OBCs and STs is close to negligible. For the 
village regime effects, the UC enclave and the first round SC enclave effects turn 
insignificant once household land holdings are controlled for: it transpires that land 
distribution is responsible for the own enclave advantages of SCs in round 1 and the 
UC advantages in both rounds. For SCs in the post liberalisation era other 
explanations must be sought. Further, and after all controls have been added, the 
round 1 net proximity gain for OBCs in upper caste dominated villages resurfaces.      
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Notice, once more, that the raw coefficients, excepting Muslims in round 1, 
remain stubborn, large and statistically significant. Hence, even after location, 
demography, village infrastructure and key factor endowments are carefully 
controlled for, the raw coefficients suggest that SCs with the same resource base and 
attributes as others not only remain the worst off but fell further behind STs and 
OBCs in the post reform years. The main exception is SCs in own enclaves; the SC 
enclave coefficient remains large and strongly significant even after land holdings and 
all other controls are added and is large enough to eliminate 80 percent of the 
remaining disadvantage vis-à-vis UC households. Notice that Muslims also 
experienced a relative post-reform setback since the raw coefficient reappears as 
(strongly) significant in round 2.    
 The pathway analysis provided valuable clues about the origins of the strong 
enclave effects observed for UCs and SCs and less for OBCs which as noted and 
essentially represent the Hindu communities in our sample. The village regime effects 
for Muslims and STs, once location were controlled for, virtually disappeared.  
           Favourable land distribution holds the key to the UC and first round SC 
enclave advantage. What remains is to explain the persistent round 2 SC enclave 
effect. To obtain further clues about the underlying mechanisms, we use income share 
as dependent variable in four alternative specifications (e.g Benjamin et al 2011): 
income share from cultivation, income share from wage work, income share from 
business, and income share from remittances.
34
 The results from these additional 
specifications are reported in Table V.  
 
[Insert table V about here] 
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With a complete set of controls (including household landholdings), the 
cultivation share of income for SC households is higher in SC enclaves: this 
coefficient is large and significant at a 1% level. From the pathway analysis we 
already know that SC income in round 2 is much higher in such villages even after 
household land is controlled for. Not surprisingly, wage income share is much lower, 
while there is no difference in the business income share of SC households within and 
outside their own enclaves, nor is there a difference in the share of income from 
remittances. There is thus no sign that business acumen outside agriculture or higher 
remittances can be held responsible for the SC enclave effect. Given the strong pre-
occupation with enterprise and non-farm development within the development 
literature, this is a surprising finding. However, and in tune with Anderson’s (2011) 
results, the explanation needs to be sought within agriculture itself. Contrast this with 
ST, OBC and Muslim enclaves: For STs, there is no enclave effect on income. The 
cultivation share of income is higher and the wage income share lower also after 
household land holdings are controlled for: the business income share is also higher in 
ST enclaves. For Muslims and OBCs we observe similar patterns for cultivation 
income, while business income is significantly lower in own enclaves.    
 
IV.B  Robustness tests and auxiliary regressions  
As discussed in section II, we conduct two robustness tests on our main results by 
replacing the dummy variables for upper caste and own group land dominance firstly 
with the share of village land owned by the dominant group and secondly with the 
fragmentation adjusted dominance measure defined by equation (3). Table VI reports 
the sign and the level of significance on the village regime parameters in the 
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specification with ‘pure’ control variables only (AEZs, state dummy variables and 
household demographic controls).
 
 
The round 1 results for these alternative specifications feature in the top half and 
the round 2 results in the bottom half of Table VI. 17 out of the 18 coefficients (9 per 
round) on the village regime variables when using the land dominance dummy are 
robust in terms of retaining sign and statistical significance (or insignificance, as the 
case may be) regardless of the dominance measure used.
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 Although it is noteworthy 
and reassuring that significance of coefficients is generally stronger for the more 
refined measures, the key results presented in Section IV.A are thus not sensitive to 
how dominance is measured. 
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            [Insert table VI about here] 
 
We also implemented specifications using growth in factor endowments (land, female 
and male education) to explore whether upper caste dominance or own enclaves have 
separate effects on land or human capital accumulation in rural India. The results, 
reported in table A2.4, show that that while the land holdings of OBCs and Muslims 
in UC villages increased, these were not associated with income gains (cfr 
coefficients in table III, column 2). A similar observation holds for OBCs in own 
enclaves, but there is no change in the income coefficients between the rounds there 
either (table III, column 2). Interestingly and for human capital accumulation, upper 
caste dominance appears to inhibit the progress of other social groups. The 
coefficients are negative for all groups (one exception), for both males and females, 
with the only statistically significant coefficient observed for male OBCs. We also 
observe adverse enclave effects on educational progress among the non-Hindu social 
groups: consistent with the descriptives, these are strongly negative for females in 
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Muslim dominated villages: a similar and strongly negative own enclave effect is 
observed for male STs.   
 
IV.C Magnitude of proximity, enclave and oppression effects 
We next explore the order of magnitude of the proximity, enclave and oppression 
effects in terms of income, income growth, and the incidence and persistence of 
poverty. As noted, the proximity effect could reflect a superior quality of schools, 
health care and sanitation in UC dominated villages; alternatively, lower castes may 
emulate upper castes’ stronger educational aspirations and farming practices; rich 
neighbours can make it less risky to adopt high yielding seed varieties since followers 
can absorb the good and bad experiences of wealthy early adopters (e.g. Foster and 
Rosenzweig 1995).           
Such proximity gains could exist alongside oppression effects manifested in 
limitations in the access to resources or markets, a hostile school environment, 
exclusion from membership in the local dairy cooperative or restrictions in the access 
to credit schemes that facilitate response to new post reform opportunities.  
         To proceed, we compute counterfactual income as if the coefficients on the 
social identity interacted with village regime variables were equal to zero and use the 
coefficients from the model with pure controls reported in column 2 in Table III. In 
that model, the coefficient on the marginalised group dummy interacted with the UC 
dominated village dummy is the net effect of proximity and oppression (as explained 
in Section II.C). In order to disentangle the two in the simulations presented here, we 
set the proximity effect equal to the coefficient on UC x DUC. In other words, we 
perform a calculation that assumes that the estimated net effect for marginalised 
groups in such villages can be decomposed into a proximity effect and a remaining 
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oppression effect by equating the former with the enclave effect for upper-caste 
Hindus (see Appendix 3 for details). 
 
 [Insert table VII about here] 
 
For round 1 and 2 income per capita and poverty, and annual income growth between 
the two rounds, Table VII reports, by marginalised group, actual and counterfactual 
figures, separately for upper-caste dominated villages and for own-group dominated 
villages. For the latter, counterfactual figures are based on what these variables would 
have been without the estimated enclave effect. For upper-caste dominated villages, 
three sets of counterfactual figures are reported. First, income, growth and poverty are 
computed as if there is no general village regime, or proximity effect (the coefficient 
on UC x DUC); next as if there is no group specific oppression effect (e.g. the 
coefficient on SC x DUC); and finally as if there is neither effect. So, for example, 
mean income per capita in round 1 for SCs living in UC-dominated villages is equal 
to 6,395 Rupees per year. Had they not benefited from the proximity effect, it would 
have been 5,758 Rupees; had they not suffered from oppression, it would have been 
6,918 Rupees; and if neither effect were at work, it would have been 6,228 Rupees. 
The last figure is lower than their actual mean income, which shows that, in this case, 
the positive proximity effect is larger (in absolute terms) than the negative oppression 
effect. 
The proximity effect on income of marginalised groups living in UC-dominated 
villages is always about 10 percent, both in round 1 and in round 2: mean income 
would thus have been some 10 percent lower had it not been for this effect. Since the 
effect on income is approximately the same size in both rounds, the growth impact is 
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negligible. The effect on the headcount percentage of poverty, on the other hand, 
depends on the group specific distribution of income in the vicinity of the poverty 
line. Muslims in round 1 benefited most and OBCs in round 2 least: poverty would 
have been 7.5 percentage points higher for the former and 4.8 percentage points 
higher for the latter, were it not for the proximity effect. 
The group specific oppression effect on income of living in UC-dominated 
villages tends to be of the same order of magnitude and thus offset the proximity 
effect, which reflects that the net effect is usually not statistically significant, with one 
exception (Muslims in round 1). Income in such villages would have been 14.2 
percent higher for SCs in round 2, 12.7 percent higher for OBCs in round 2, and 15.3 
percent higher for Muslims in round 1. The effect on growth is pronounced, too. SCs 
would have experienced 1.83 instead of 1.32 percent annual growth (22.1 percent 
over the entire period instead of 15.6 percent) and OBCs 1.36 instead of 0.89 percent 
(16.0 instead of 10.7 percent), were it not for oppression. When either the oppression 
effect or the proximity effect dominates for income, the same effect does not always 
dominate in the case for poverty, which must be related to peculiarities of the PDF of 
income. It is worth noting, though, that poverty reduction would have been very 
similar in the absence of oppression – marginalised groups would have experienced 
about the same amount of poverty reduction as they experienced actually, because the 
level effect in both rounds was of the same order of magnitude. 
Enclave effects in the specification used are significant only for SCs and OBCs, 
in both rounds. For OBCs they are of the same order of magnitude (but positive) as 
the oppression effects remarked on above for this group. For SCs they are much 
larger. Income per capita would have been 13.5 percent lower in round 1, and 25.9 
percent lower in round 2, annual growth 1.47 percentage points lower (23.8 percent 
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less growth over the period), and poverty 7.6 and 18.0 percentage points higher in 
round 1 and round 2, were it not for the enclave effect. Poverty would thus have been 
far more persistent for SCs in own-dominated villages in the absence of this effect. 
In summary, we find sizeable proximity gains to those residing in UC-
dominated villages for income and poverty (but not for growth and poverty 
reduction), and an offsetting oppression effect of roughly the same order of 
magnitude. Growth for SCs and OBCs is substantially negatively affected by 
oppression. Enclave effects are large and positive for OBCs and especially SCs in 
terms of income and the absence of poverty, and for SCs in terms of growth, too. 
 
V CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Using a unique household panel data set for rural India covering the years 
1993/94 and 2004/05, we have tested whether households from Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Muslims and Other Backward Classes fare better or worse in terms 
of income levels when residing in villages dominated by upper castes and in villages 
dominated by their own group. We began by noting that the gap between Upper Caste 
and all other social groups widened substantially between the two panel rounds.   
Our initial specification suggested  a  positive net gain from proximity to upper 
castes (e.g. Sethi and Somanathan 2010) for SCs and OBCs in round 1 and SCs, STs 
and OBCs in round 2 and thus that the proximity effect dominates the oppression 
effect. However, once we control for the agroecologically more favourable location of 
such villages, this net gain disappears and the proximity and oppression effects cancel 
each other out. A round 1 net proximity gain for OBCs resurfaces once all controls 
have been included, thus adding clout to the proximity hypothesis.     
In order to isolate the oppression effect, we compute counterfactual household 
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income as if all social groups benefit equally from the advantages to the village as a 
whole that UC dominance brings, and find that it can be large. For instance, the 
income levels of SCs living in upper caste dominated villages would have been 14.2 
percent higher in round 2 were it not for oppression effects, while annual income 
growth would have been 0.5 percentage points higher, 1.83 instead of 1.32 percent.   
 Put differently, while both the proximity and the oppression hypothesis have 
merit, neither works satisfactorily on its own. They work, moreover, in the expected 
opposite directions: Ignoring either through a focus on the proximity hypothesis or the 
oppression hypothesis alone would deprive social scientists interested in the origins of 
caste-based disparities in rural India of vital insights.  
When focusing on income we find strong support for the positive enclave 
hypothesis for UCs, SCs and OBCs in both rounds; UCs perform much better in own 
dominated villages than anywhere else. SCs and OBCs also perform better in their 
own villages than in villages dominated by upper castes and in benchmark ‘other 
villages’. Once location is controlled for, these village enclave effects are limited to 
the Hindu social groups: there are no parallel effects for STs and Muslims. In terms of 
income the Hindu social groups thus benefit from the dominance of ‘their own kind’ 
in the village communities where they reside.   
For human capital accumulation, our findings suggest inhibiting effects of upper 
caste dominance on males and females from other social groups (negative signs, but 
only one significant coefficient) while own enclaves negatively affect educational 
progress for Muslim women and ST men.     
We shed new light on the pathways through which welfare disparities between 
different social groups within and outside villages dominated by upper castes may be 
narrowed. Educational attainment matters, but mainly outside UC dominated villages 
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and outside own enclaves. The strong enclave effects for UCs in both rounds and SCs 
in round 1 disappear once land holdings are controlled for. The remaining gaps in the 
raw identify coefficients are also very substantially reduced thus underscoring that 
land distribution remains a key determinant of identity-based disparities in rural India. 
This is in contrast to Dercon and Krishnan’s (2007) findings based on the ICRISAT-
panel which indicated that caste-based rural disparities essentially have educational 
roots. 
Consistent with Anderson’s (2011) findings for Yadavs in Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh, but in our case extending to marginalised groups below the pollution barrier, 
Scheduled Caste households in own dominated villages realised higher incomes in 
both rounds and experienced far more rapid poverty reduction between the two 
rounds. Our analysis of income shares suggests that the explanation for this 
advantage, perhaps surprisingly, is unrelated to non-farm employment or business 
enterprise development and is instead anchored in advantages in agricultural 
production: a higher return on own-account cultivation when SCs are not likely to be 
discriminated against in irrigation (e.g. Anderson 2011) and other markets for 
agricultural inputs and outputs.  
Our results, based on fundamentals, provide a timely empirical corrective to 
accounts of sustained SC progress relative to other groups and provide an important 
reminder to those who, inspired by India’s ‘silent revolution’, place great hope in the 
transformative potential of the democratic process whether on its own or aided by 
political reservations. A similar caveat applies to strong beliefs in the transformative 
potential of economic liberalisation. The grip of caste in rural India appears to be 
firmly rooted in patterns of land ownership. The exception is SCs in own enclaves 
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who are favourably placed for escaping this grip; the SC enclave effect remains large 
and strongly significant even after land holdings and all other controls are added.    
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Table I: Number of land and population dominated villages by social group 
 Largest land-holding group in village 
 SC ST OBC MUS UC OTH Total 
Largest population group in village:  
Scheduled Castes (SC) 24 2 12 1 25 4 68 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0 65 3 0 2 0 70 
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 1 0 196 3 25 10 235 
Muslims (MUS) 0 0 2 35 4 2 43 
Upper Castes (UC) 0 1 1 0 223 6 231 
Others and none (OTH) 2 0 8 0 18 1 9 
Total 27 68 222 39 297 26 679 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Figures are number of panel villages in which the row social groups are the largest population group and 
the column social groups own the largest land share. The category “others” consists of villages in which either an 
unclassified group or no single group is land- or population-dominant. 
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Table II: Number of households by social group and village regime 
               Land dominant social group 
 SC ST OBC MUS UC OTH Total 
Social group of households:        
Scheduled Castes (SC) 222 68 694 109 1,040 119 2,252 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) 23 552 141 21 95 3 835 
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 86 169 1,608 64 852 130 2,909 
Muslims (MUS) 52 10 130 337 145 25 699 
Upper Castes (UC) 44 61 381 29 1,810 91 2,416 
Total 427 860 2,954 560 3,942 368 9,111 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations. 
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Table III Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and 
locational and demographic controls 
Model: Village regime terms  
                   (1) 
Plus controls 
(2) 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
Social identity:     
HH is SC   -0.383*** -0.506*** -0.380*** -0.450*** 
       (-8.21)     (-10.15)       (-8.58)     (-9.45) 
HH is ST   -0.316***  -0.461*** -0.315*** -0.372*** 
       (-4.37)       (-5.67)       (-4.89)       (-5.35) 
HH is OBC  -0.296***  -0.310*** -0.230*** -0.241*** 
       (-4.85)       (-4.40)       (-4.10)       (-3.92) 
HH is MUS  -0.294***  -0.445*** -0.207*** -0.323*** 
       (-5.34)       (-5.96)       (-3.68)       (-4.71) 
Village regime 
variables: 
    
SC x DSC       0.037   0.264***   0.145**   0.300*** 
   (0.49)       (2.74)       (2.04)       (3.06) 
ST x DST -0.088    -0.050   -0.018   0.003 
       (-1.16)       (-0.59)       (-0.27)       (0.05) 
OBC x DOBC 0.167***    0.113*  0.105**   0.094* 
       (2.88)       (1.74)       (1.97)       (1.75) 
MUS x DMUS -0.023      0.164*   -0.016    0.124 
       (-0.29)       (1.74)       (-0.20)       (1.37) 
UC x DUC 0.198***     0.288*** 0.105**   0.109** 
       (3.84)       (5.14)       (2.22)       (2.13) 
SC x DUC 0.088**    0.139*** 0.0264 -0.024 
       (2.04)       (3.01)       (0.60)       (-0.54) 
ST x DUC    -0.020     0.260**    -0.023   0.103 
       (-0.15)       (2.10)       (-0.20)       (0.341) 
MUS x DUC    0.013     0.142  -0.037   0.026 
       (0.16)       (1.46)       (-0.46)       (0.29) 
OBC x DUC 0.176***   0.156** 0.032   -0.0105 
 (2.85)          (2.32)       (0.55)       (-0.18) 
Controls:     
Household 
composition 
No No Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological 
zones 
No No Yes Yes 
State dummy 
variables 
No No Yes Yes 
     
R squared (overall) 0.0667 0.1065 0.2124 0.2837 
N 9108 9108 9108 9108 
Source: HDPI-I (“round 1”) and II (“round 2”) surveys, panel households only; authors’ calculations. Notes: Dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of annual per capita household income in constant 1993/94 prices, with round 2 figures converted using 
NSSO state-specific rural CPIs. Random effects, with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering within 
villages. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively; robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Demographic 
controls are the sex of the household head, number of boys aged 0-5, girls 0-5, boys 6-14, males 15-19, females 15-19, males 20-
24, females 20-24, males 25-49, females 25-49, males 50-59, females 50-59, males 60 and older, and females 60 and older. See 
table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for the full specification.   
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Table IV Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and 
additional controls: village infrastructure, household education and land  
Controls added: Plus education (hh) Plus land (hh) 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
Social identity:     
HH is SC   -0.255*** -0.316*** -0.166*** -0.248*** 
       (-6.17)       (-7.18)       (-4.27)       (-6.06) 
HH is ST   -0.177*** -0.232*** -0.157*** -0.202*** 
       (-2.85)       (-3.49)       (-2.73)       (-3.08) 
HH is OBC  -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.136*** -0.128*** 
       (-2.85)       (-2.83)       (-2.81)       (-2.62) 
HH is MUS   -0.119** -0.216***   -0.070 -0.138** 
       (-2.17)       (-3.31)       (-1.38)       (-2.22) 
Village regime:     
SC x DSC   0.129** 0.249***    0.067 0.202** 
       (2.01)       (2.70)       (1.09)       (2.41) 
ST x DST   -0.007     0.009    0.012    -0.008 
       (-0.12)       (0.14)       (0.21)       (-0.14) 
OBC x DOBC  0.100* 0.074 0.067     0.030 
       (1.94)       (1.50)       (1.51)       (0.68) 
MUS x DMUS    0.005 0.15*   -0.047 0.087 
       (0.07)       (1.80)       (-0.74)       (1.15) 
UC x DUC   0.120*** 0.108**    0.032 0.026 
       (2.66)       (2.16)       (0.79)       (0.56) 
SC x DUC  0.015  -0.04    0.044 -0.018 
       (0.34)       (-0.98)       (1.18)       (-0.46) 
ST x DUC   -0.006 0.124   0.003  0.138 
       (-0.05)       (1.24)       (0.04)       (1.51) 
MUS x DUC   -0.004 0.050    0.062  0.026 
       (-0.05)       (0.54)       (0.83)       (0.30) 
OBC x DUC   0.039 -0.009    0.11**  0.023 
       (0.69)       (-0.18)       (2.25)       (0.49) 
Controls:     
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological zones Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household land No No Yes Yes 
     
R squared (overall) 0.2702 0.3413 0.4255 0.4182 
N 9108 9108 9108 9108 
Source and Notes: as for Table III. 
Additional notes: Education variables are dummy variables used as controls for the highest level of male and female education in 
the household. Land refers to controls for the logarithm of owned household land measured in acres, and the logarithm of 
irrigated household land measured in acres. Village size is captured by village population (logarithm) and total village land. The 
village infrastructure controls are the presence within the village of a busstop (1), or within its vicinity of a railway station (2), 
medical clinic (3), schools, and if so, at which level of education (4), or a market/mandi (5), as well as the type of road ( footpath 
only, kutcha road, pucca road) that leads to the village (6).  The full specification is reported in table A2.2 in Appendix 2. 
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Table V: Round 2 estimation results of the effects on income share of social identity, 
village regime with full set of controls  
 Agriculture  Wage Business        Remittances 
     
Social identity:     
HH is SC   -0.137*** 0.196*** -0.030** -0.014* 
       (-7.15)       (9.60)       (-2.30)       (-1.71) 
HH is ST   -0.098*** 0.186*** -0.061*** -0.013 
       (-3.64)       (6.13)       (-3.44)       (-1.33) 
HH is OBC  -0.014   0.008  0.042**  -0.013 
       (-0.60)       (0.32)        (2.17)       (-1.38) 
HH is MUS   -0.098**  -0.009     0.111*** 0.005 
       (-3.29)       (-0.27)       (3.32)       (0.33) 
Village regime:     
SC x DSC   0.116***  -0.151***     0.023 0.006 
       (3.84)       (-3.16)       (1.25)       (0.41) 
ST x DST   0.081***   -0.112     0.040**    -0.001 
       (2.57)       (-3.39)       (2.55)       (-0.14) 
OBC x DOBC   0.075***   -0.034     -0.049***     0.006 
       (3.24)       (-1.34)       (-2.76)       (0.81) 
MUS x DMUS    0.066 0.0107   -0.070* -0.009 
       (1.58)       (0.24)       (-190)       (-0.52) 
UC x DUC   0.080***   -0.060***    -0.013 0.005 
       (3.63)       (2.77)       (-1.04)       (0.67) 
SC x DUC  -0.008    -0.066    0.002 0.006 
       (-0.50)       (-0.33)       (0.26)       (0.98) 
ST x DUC   0.036 -0.050    0.018  -0.005 
       (-0.05)       (-1.15)       (0.325)       (-0.37) 
MUS x DUC   -0.106 0.071    -0.106  -0.027 
       (-0.25)       (1.30)       (-0.24)       (-1.52) 
OBC x DUC   -0.024 0.016    -0.009  0.012 
       (0.69)       (0.56)       (-0.47)       (1.43) 
Controls:     
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological zones Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household land  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R squared (overall) 0.3375    0.2679 0.0842 0.1278 
N 9108 9108 9108 9108 
Source and Notes: as for Table III. 
Additional notes: Education variables are dummy variables used as controls for the highest level of male and female education in 
the household. Land refers to controls for the logarithm of owned household land measured in acres, and the logarithm of 
irrigated household land measured in acres. Village size is captured by village population (logarithm) and total village land. The 
village infrastructure controls are the presence within the village of a busstop (1), or within its vicinity of a railway station (2), 
medical clinic (3), schools, and if so, at which level of education (4), or a market/mandi (5), as well as the type of road (footpath 
only, kutcha road, pucca road) that leads to the village (6).  The full specification is reported in table A2.2 in Appendix 2. 
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Table VI: Qualitative summary of robustness tests 
Main dominance 
measure:  
Main dominance 
measure results 
Land percentage of 
largest land holding 
group in village 
Dominance-adjusted 
Herfindahl index (eq. 
3) 
Round 1    
SC x DSC ++ ++ ++ 
ST x DST Ns Ns Ns 
OBC x DOBC ++ Ns Ns 
MUS x DMUS Ns Ns Ns 
UC x DUC ++ +++ +++ 
SC x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
ST x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
MUS x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
OBC x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
Round 2    
SC x DSC +++ +++ +++ 
ST x  DST Ns Ns Ns 
OBC x DOBC + +++ +++ 
MUS x DMUS Ns Ns Ns 
UC x DUC ++ +++ +++ 
SC x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
ST x DUC Ns Ns Ns 
MUS x DUC 
OBC x DUC 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Notes:  +++, ++, + indicates positive coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, ---, --, - indicates 
negative coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Ns indicates not significant, all in the specification 
with social group, village regime,  agro-ecological zones, state dummies and household demographic composition 
variables.  
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Table VII: Actual and counterfactual annual per capita income (in 1993/94 
Rupees), growth (% per year) and poverty (%) without village regime effects by 
social group 
 
 Scheduled 
Castes 
Scheduled 
Tribes 
Other Backward 
Classes 
Muslims 
 Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Upper-caste dominated 
villages  
        
Mean income per capita         
Actual 6,395 7,391 6,760 8,905 8,309   9,200 6,626 7,915 
Counterfactual – without  
proximity effect 
5,758 6,628 6,086 7,985 7,480   8,249 5,965 7,098 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
6,918 8,443 7,683 8,959 8,938 10,367 7,637 8,600 
Counterfactual – without 
proximity and oppression 
effects 
6,228 7,571 6,917 8,034 8,046   9,297 6,876 7,712 
Growth in mean income per 
capita (% per year between 
1994 and 2005) 
        
Actual - 1.32 - 2.54 - 0.93 - 1.63 
Counterfactual – without 
proximity effect 
- 1.29 - 2.50 - 0.89 - 1.59 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
- 1.83 - 1.41 - 1.36 - 1.09 
Counterfactual – without  
proximity and oppression 
effects 
- 1.79 - 1.37 - 1.32 - 1.05 
Poverty headcount (%)         
Actual 43.9 35.5 46.3 33.7 30.8 27.7 35.9 33.1 
Counterfactual – without  
proximity effect 
49.5 42.2 51.6 41.1 35.6 32.4 43.4 40.0 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
38.9 29.9 38.9 31.6 27.2 22.5 29.0 26.9 
Counterfactual – without  
proximity and oppression 
effects 
45.6 34.4 46.3 
 
41.1 32.2 27.5 33.8 36.6 
         
Own-group dominated villages          
Mean income per capita         
Actual 5,954 9,842 5,331 5,805 8,158 9,187 6,553 8,231 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
5,151 7,291 5,427 5,788 7,345 8,362 6,658 7,271 
Growth in mean income per 
capita (% per year between 
1994 and 2005) 
        
Actual - 4.68 - 0.78 - 1.09 - 2.09 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
- 3.21 - 0.59 - 1.19 - 0.80 
Poverty headcount (%)         
Actual 52.3 29.7 50.9 47.1 34.8 30.2 51.0 37.1 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
59.9 47.7 50.4 47.3 40.4 36.1 50.1 45.1 
Notes: counterfactual figures are all based on counterfactual income computed for each household in villages land 
dominated by indicated group, using coefficients from the round 1 and round 2 regressions of the natural 
logarithm of income on village regime and social identity variables, controlling for agro-ecological zones, state 
dummies, and household demographic characteristics, as reported in column 2, table III  and in full in Appendix 2. 
Figures in italics are based on coefficients insignificant at the 10 percent level.  
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Figure captions: 
 
Figure 1: Mean per capita household income (in 1993/94 Rupees) and poverty 
headcount (proportion) by social group, round and village regime 
 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Poverty is the share of the indicated sub-sample with income below the 
NSSO state-specific rural poverty lines. 
 
Figure 2: Male and female illiteracy by social group, round and village regime  
 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Figures are averaged across all households in the sub-sample indicated, 
and are based on the highest level of educational achievement in the 
household, i.e. on households of which not a single (female or male, as 
appropriate) member is literate. 
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1
 Apart from Anderson (2011), the caste dominance concept has been applied in 
economic studies by, among others, Besley, Pande and Rao (2005), Dercon and 
Krishnan (2007), and Do and Iyer (2010).   
2
 Caste may refer to jati (sub-caste) or to the more general varna, the latter comprising 
four broad occupational groups with Brahmins at the top followed by Kshatriyas 
(warriors), Vaishyas (traders and merchants) and Shudras (manual workers and 
craftspersons) at the bottom. SCs may be portrayed as a subset of the Shudras or a 
separate category. Their main distinguishing characteristic is a particularly degrading 
(‘polluting’) traditional occupation.  
3
 The criteria for Scheduled Tribe classification are (i) tribal origin; (ii) primitive 
ways of life and habitation in remote and less accessible areas; (iii) general 
backwardness in all respects (Pande 2003, 1138). 
4
 Examples from the recent past include caste demarcators in how people dressed and 
spoke and what they were allowed to do. In 19
th
 Century Kerala, “when a Namboodiri 
Brahmin approached, a Paraiya labourer had to cry out in advance, lest the sight of 
him pollute his superior” (Guha 2007, 287). Also in Kerala and during conversations 
with a person of higher caste, members of lowly ranked castes were expected to use 
debasing words to describe themselves (Menon 1994,19). Nambissan (1996) presents 
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historical evidence of how Scheduled Caste children, while permitted to attend 
school, could be denied entry to the classroom.  
 
6
 The issue was first addressed by the Other Backward Class Commission, appointed 
by Prime Minister Nehru, and later and more decisively by the Mandal Commission 
(1978-80). The latter’s recommendations, extending reservation benefits to OBCs, 
were declared constitutionally legitimate in 1992.  
7
 This is in contrast to the widespread changes in social practices in Western and 
Eastern Uttar Pradesh reported by Kapur et al (2010). However and unlike Kapur et al 
(2010), we focus on a fundamental, namely household income.    
8
 Existing studies make use of nationally representative cross-sectional data and 
Blinder Oaxaca or alternative decomposition techniques to quantify the disadvantage 
associated with Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or religious identity (e.g. Kijima 
2006; Gang et al 2008a). Dercon and Krishnan (2007) use the ICRISAT household 
panel but their analysis is limited to 204 households from six villages and two states. 
Lower educational attainment accounts for the slower standard of living 
improvements of SC/STs. 
9
 As Gang et al (2008a) note, present labour market disadvantage may not reflect 
labour market discrimination but that cross-section analysis picks up pre-market 
variation in the quality of education received. While recent studies of upper end 
labour markets use field experiments to tackle such hurdles to identification, 
inferences are limited to discrimination at the point of labour market entry (e.g. 
Thorat and Attewell 2007). 
10
 Exceptions include Dreze and Kingdon (2001) who find that rural Scheduled Caste 
children have an ‘intrinsic disadvantage’ and a lower chance of attending school even 
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after household wealth, parental education and motivation and school quality are 
controlled for. See Hoff et al (2009) for an experimental explanation for the greater 
economic vulnerability of lower castes.  
11
 We hence consider the liberalisation not as a discrete historical event but an 
ongoing process with cumulative impacts over time. Neither GDP growth, growth in 
the services sector nor private sector investment had picked up by the time the first 
panel round (1993/94) was completed. For supportive evidence and more 
comprehensive accounts of India’s growth turnaround, see Sen (2007) and Panagariya 
(2008). 
12
 Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find that parliamentary constituencies with a 
concentration of Brahmins had better access to schools and piped water in 1971.  
13
 A full description of the variables, summary statistics including comparison with 
other major India surveys, and an exposition of the sampling methodology can be 
found in Desai et al. (2009). 
14
 These point estimates are close between the data sources, as is the implied 
reduction in rural poverty. The NCAER income data imply a rural poverty decline of 
9.3 percentage points, and the NSSO expenditure data of 8.7 points. 
15
 See Singh’s (1984) account of caste among non-Hindus. Among Muslims, Fuller 
(1996) and other contributors to the same volume contend that while caste-like 
arrangements are common, few admit to their existence. See also Appendix 1. 
16
 States included in the panel are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar (+ Jharkand in round 2), 
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh (+ Chhattisgarh in 
round 2), Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh (+ 
Uttarakhand in round 2) and West Bengal. Recontact details were largely lost in 
Assam due to a flood and in Karnataka because of human error. The 12 remaining 
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households in Assam do not feature in the final analysis because of lack of 
information on Agro-Ecological Zones (see below). 
17
 See Table 1 in Appendix in Desai et al (2009) which reports the proportions of the 
panel household sample in round 2 and those of the refresher sample in categories of 
age (8 categories), gender (2), individual education (6), social group (6), place of 
residence (4), maximum adult education (6), and income (6). The absolute differences 
between the proportions of the two samples (38 comparisons in total) range from 0.04 
to 5.28 percentage points, with a mean value of 1.20 and a median of 0.56 percentage 
points. 
18
 The p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis that income is not associated with 
panel inclusion is equal to 0.937. 
19
 These results are not presented or further discussed here, but are available on 
request.  
20
 See the extensive literature review on land markets in Dreze et al (1999).  
21
 Details are available from the authors.  
22
 Throughout income is per capita per annum and in constant 1993/94 prices, 
converted using NSSO state-specific rural CPIs. 
23
 This is equivalent to estimating (4) with one modification: replace β5UCxDUC with 
β5DUC, which we did in a previous version of the paper. All coefficients are 
unaffected by this modification, apart from the γ–parameters, the effects on income 
for other social groups of living in a UC-dominated village, which are then net of the 
approximated proximity effect, and can thus be thought of as an oppression effect. 
24
 The relevance of locational disadvantage, which corresponds highly imperfectly 
with state boundaries, for poverty (and inequality) in rural India is extensively 
documented by Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003).  
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25
 Echoing Bardhan’s (1970) assertion that redistributive reforms have not been 
implemented with sincerity.  
26
 The general inactivity of land markets emphasised in footnote 20 adds further 
impetus  to Anderson’s (2011) claim.   
27
 Their map (Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003,14-15)) divides India into 19 agro-
ecological zones where careful classifications of land surface capture initial 
conditions that indicate agricultural productivity potential. The zones are classified by 
variation in soil types, rainfall patterns, altitude, whether coastal and other factors that 
affect this potential. Two examples of these zone definitions are zone 7: Deccan 
Plateau of Telangana and Eastern Ghats, hot semi-arid eco-region with red loamy 
soils – GP 90-150 d. and zone 5: Central (Malwa) highlands, Gujarat plains and 
Kathiarwar peninsular, hot arid ecoregion with medium and deep black soils and GP 
90-150 d.       
28
 Other descriptive statistics for this panel including mean household income by 
state, land holdings, levels of education (of the household head), occupation and real 
household income per capita for different social groups and show a close 
correspondence between a priori expectations and summary statistics. Marginalised 
social groups own less land and are less educated than others. 41% of SC households 
and 48 % of Muslim households have their own land; the figures for STs, OBC and 
UCs are 70%, 63% and 81%, respectively. Consistent with Kijima (2006), 
marginalised communities also appear to receive lower returns on their human capital.  
29
 We report the ‘raw’ social identity coefficients without any controls in table A2.1 in 
Appendix 2.  These coefficients suggest that the disparity between upper castes and 
each of the other social groups widened during the reform years. 
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30
 The responses of the ‘raw’ identity and village regime coefficients to the step-wise 
introduction of each of the three sets of ‘pure’ controls may be gauged in full in table 
A2.1 in Appendix 2. 
31
 The results in our first raw regressions appear to be inconsistent with the 
observation of STs making less progress than SCs in the post liberalisation era (e.g. 
Iversen 2012). We observe that STs do better than SCs in non-UC and non-(SC or ST) 
dominated villages while SCs do better than STs in UC dominated villages in round 1 
and better than STs in UC dominated villages and in particular in their own SC 
enclaves in round 2. This, if anything, provides a more nuanced picture than offered 
elsewhere. We also, in response to a request from a reviewer, included villages 
dominated by OBCs along with social group interactions to explore whether OBC 
dominance affected SCs or other social groups differently. The only insight on offer is 
that ST households in such villages fare notably worse in round 2.        
32
 Sample size limitations prevent the exploration of these enclave effects at the jati-
level.  
33
 As can be seen in Appendix 2, adding the village infrastructure controls detailed in 
the note to table IV has close to negligible effects on the raw identity and village 
regime coefficients. On the face of it and contrary to received wisdom (e.g Pinstrup-
Andersen and Shimokawa 2006), the scope for reducing identity based disadvantage 
by improving village infrastructure appears more limited than expected. 
34
 The full set of results is available on request. 
35
  The exception is the coefficient on OBC x DOBC in round 1, which is no longer 
significant when alternative dominance measures are used. 
36
 In response to a referee request, we implemented separate regressions by social 
groups with results reported in table A2.3. In spite of the much fewer observations, 
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the enclave results are retained for OBCs and SCs (round 2). For UCs, enclave 
coefficients turn insignificant in both rounds - at the outset a source of concern. Given 
that the latter could simply reflect the much smaller sample, we ‘compensate’ for the 
loss of observations by replacing the dominance dummy with the two more refined 
dominance measures in the UC regressions. For these two more refined measures, the 
significance of the round 1 UC enclave coefficient is restored (at the 5 % level), while 
the round 2 coefficient is borderline insignificant. We hence conclude that our UC 
enclave results are robust.           
 1
APPENDIX 1: Construction of variables to capture upper caste dominance.  
 
The village and household questionnaires contain data on three classifications of 
social groups, firstly and most disaggregated by jati [and name of tribe] (C1) (for 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and STs), secondly by five broad categories (C2), namely 
Brahmin, OBC (Other backward classes), SC (Scheduled Caste), ST (Scheduled 
Tribe) and Other and finally by eight religious categories (C3), Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Tribal and Other. The village questionnaire also 
contains information on the most (upto eight) numerous jatis, the percentage of the 
village population each of these jatis represent, and the percent of village land owned 
by each of these same jatis.  
The oppression hypothesis is founded on the notion of (upper) caste dominance. If 
restricted to ritual rank, a simple and narrow definition would be to limit the upper 
caste label to Brahmins. Notions of upper caste advantage (and dominance) do, 
however, stretch beyond this top layer of the varna hierarchy.1,2 A pragmatic 
alternative would be to add the “Other” category from the household questionnaire; 
the combination Brahmin (C2) plus “Other (C2)” and Hindu (C3) would then 
represent a broad definition of upper or forward caste Hindus.  
This latter option has important limitations; Firstly, the exclusive focus on Hindus 
would miss out on social groups who may be in a position to wield considerable 
power and influence but who belong to a different faith. To illustrate, some of the 
numerically important jatis in our panel transcend religious boundaries; in Punjab 
there are significant numbers of Sikh and Hindu Jat households and Sikh and Hindu 
Dalit households with inter-caste violence involving Jat and Dalit Sikhs.3 For 
Muslims and noted in footnote 15 in the main text, Fuller (1996) and others in the 
same volume contend that while caste-like arrangements are common, few within the 
Muslim community admit to their existence.4 In spite of social ranks among Muslims, 
the less accurate reporting of the social groups that Muslim panel households belong 
                                                 
1 In addition, the prevalence of Brahmin households varies across regions. 
2 Even among Brahmins there are, of course, more fine-tuned internal rankings – Gouda Saraswath or Konkani 
Brahmins, who are fish eating residents of Karnataka’s Coastal belt, have lower social status locally than the 
strictly vegetarian Madhwa or Udupi Brahmins.   
3See http://hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2013/stories/20030704002703900.htm. Punjab is also the state with the highest 
percentage of Scheduled Castes in its population (28.9 % according to Census of India 2001). See Jodhka’s (2004) 
discussion on Sikhism and caste.   
4 Jeffrey et al (2007: 43) note how ‘during the pre-colonial era there were marked divisions between a very small, 
upper caste Muslim elite and other Muslims castes, such as weavers, carpenters and barbers’. 
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to, left us with no other option but to define Muslim households by their religion 
alone. A similar strategy was adopted for Scheduled Tribes. Although the tribe a 
household belongs to is accurately reported, ethnographic evidence is not supportive 
of local hierarchies; STs thus features as a single social category in our analysis.  
Secondly, the process of “de-Sanskritisation”, whereby social groups lobby to 
downgrade their official status in order to avail of reservation benefits implies that the 
definitions of forward castes that anthropologists and sociologists, informed by 
careful field observations, subscribe to, are increasingly out of tune with official and 
survey data social group categories. The implementation of the Mandal Commission’s 
(1978-80) recommendations added fresh impetus to reservations as political 
battleground and in the present political climate, it is not unusual to interpret the 
absence of ‘backward’ status as evidence of a social group’s lack of political clout. 
Important groups that have acquired OBC status, include the ‘clean-caste’ Vokkaligas, 
the dominant peasant caste in Central and Southern Karnataka (e.g. Srinivas 1978; 
Epstein et al. 1998), the ritually superior Lingayats in the same state (Bayly 1999; 
294) and more recently the Jats in Uttar Pradesh (e. g. Jeffrey 2001) and Rajasthan; 
official status is therefore, in key instances and increasingly, a reflection of political 
opportunism aimed at placating important vote banks with the unfortunate side effect 
of weakening the reliability of official status as indicator of ritual status.5  
Other variations in caste status are found at the lower end: Nuniyas and Dhanuks, 
who are OBCs in Uttar Pradesh, have Scheduled Caste status in West-Bengal. Dhobis 
(washermen), have SC status in some states but not in others. For jatis traditionally 
concentrated in the most degrading occupations, like leatherworkers (e.g. Chamars) 
and sweepers (e.g. Balmikis), SC status is less variant to state boundaries.  
Further, social groups that are not OBC, SC or ST should not necessarily be treated 
as upper or forward castes for analytical purposes. There are intermediate social 
groups in many regions for whom a more fine tuned distinction is desirable. Rods, an 
important agricultural caste in Haryana, is classified as ‘other’ and thus forward 
officially as well as in the household questionnaire; this does not square with 
anthropological field observations (Prem Chowdhry, pers comm.). Further, and in 
tune with the Mandal commission’s view and report, important agricultural castes 
                                                 
5 While de-Sanskritisation so far has tended to involve attempts to gain OBC-status, recent agitations by the 
Gujjar-community based on comparisons with the Meena community in Rajasthan aimed to downgrade their 
official status from OBC to ST. Similarly, in an article on UP politics, the Deccan Herald (4 March 2008), listed a 
number of groups whose official status were proposed ‘downgraded’ from OBC to SC.   
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such as the Kurmis of North and Kunbis of Central India do not enjoy the same local 
stature as Jats and Marathas, respectively (Singh 1992; 41 and Report of the 
Backward Class Commission, p.56 as cited in Jaffrelot 2003; 323). For the former 
two, the OBC classification is therefore appropriate.  
In our interpretation of upper caste which is informed by anthropological 
observations, we adhere to ritual rank as far as the top and bottom layer is concerned, 
but disconnect, whenever appropriate and for reasons mentioned above, from official 
categories for the more fluid middle layer. While this imposes an additional work 
burden, it is important to distinguish our small-scale endeavour from past efforts to 
develop comprehensive caste rankings for rural India. British colonial administrators 
have subsequently been caricatured for believing in the possibility of such a task 
which at the time paved the way for an obsession with caste and jati among late 
Victorian data collectors (Bayly 1999, chapter 3). For North-India, our classification 
of the most important and by far the most numerous groups (and households in our 
panel) is consistent with the Mandal Commission’s views and according to which the 
following broad groups should be treated as forward or upper castes; Brahmins 
(including Bhumihars) Rajputs, Kayasthas, Jats, Marathas, Vaishyas/Banias 
(Jaffrelot 2003; 323).                 
An informed reader will notice the inclusion of cultivating castes like North-Indian 
Jats along with the conspicuous absence of similar castes in the South on the Mandal 
commission’s list. There is also a distinction between the caste ‘taxonomy’ in 
Jaffrelot’s (2003) classifications of Indian politicians and the Mandal commission list 
with the former denoting the top layer among cultivating castes as ‘intermediate’. 
Jaffrelot’s ‘intermediate group’ includes among others the aforementioned Jats, plus 
Reddy and Kamma in Andhra Pradesh and Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka. 
Apart from us preferring ‘upper’ or ‘forward’ to ‘intermediate’ our classification is 
also for the main and most numerous groups (e.g Khandayats in Orissa, Patidars in 
Gujarat) consistent with Jaffrelot (2003).6          
Table A1 provides a listing of upper castes based on our definition and begins with 
all India upper caste jatis; these are classified as upper castes in all states. The state 
listing provides additional upper caste jatis, which are either sub-groups of the main 
                                                 
6 The state-wise official lists of STs, SCs and OBCs provide a rich source of information and were extensively 
consulted to cross check the SC and ST classifications in the raw data.    
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jatis (Jats or Rajputs, say) or belong to a different upper caste social group (e.g 
Mahajan; Leva Patel). Note that the following list is based exclusively on jatis that 
feature in the panel data set/village level social composition data. If a state is not 
specifically listed (e.g. Maharashtra), all upper caste groups in that state are already 
included in the ALL INDIA row. Notice also that the jatis in the ALL India row are 
by far the most numerous in the North. A careful reader may also notice that while 
Andhra castes and Kerala Nayars are included in Tamil Nadu, this is not the case the 
other way around. This is a co-incidence – there are no upper caste households from 
Tamil Nadu amongst our Andhra Pradesh panel households.       
 Upper castes 
ALL INDIA Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput (general, Thakur), 
Kayastha, Kshatriya, Khatri, Maratha, Jat (Sikh 
and Hindu), Marwari, Bania (e.g. Agarwal, 
Gupta) (plus equivalents in the South: Vysya in 
Andhra Pradesh, Chettiar in Tamil Nadu) 
ADDITIONAL BY STATE 
Himachal Pradesh Rajput (Suniar), Choudhary  
Punjab Rajput (Suniar), Kamboj (Sikh), Choudhary, 
Mahant (Sikh), Arora, Ahluwalia, Mahajan, Sood, 
Visnoi 
Uttaranchal Rana 
Haryana Rajput (Chauhan, Bishnoi), Jat (Jhangi), Kamboj 
(Sikh)   
Rajasthan Choudhary, Mahajan 
Gujarat Patel (general, Patidar, Leva, Kadava), Rajput 
(Jadeja [Chandravanshi], Parmar, Solanki), 
Darbar 
Uttar Pradesh Rajput (Chauhan, Negi [Gharwali]), Srivastava, 
Choudhary 
West Bengal Pokhrel, Dahal, Chettri, Mahishya, Sadgop, Roy 
Orissa Patnaik (general, Karan), Pradhan, Khandayat, 
Odia, Kalandi 
Madhya Pradesh Jat (Tomar), Choudhary, Maharaj 
Andhra Pradesh Reddy, Kapu [Balija, Telaga], Kamma [Naidu], 
Velama, Chowdary, Rajulu 
Karnataka Lingayat, Vokkaliga    
Tamil Nadu Mudaliar, Vellalar, Nayar, Reddy, Naidu, Kamma 
Naidu 
Kerala Nayar (Nair) 
 
 
References additional to those in the main text: 
 
Chowdhry, P. (2007): Contentious Marriages, Eloping Couples: Gender, Caste and  
Patriarchy in Northern India, Oxford University Press.   
Epstein, T. S., A.P. Suryanarayana and T. Thimmegowda (1998): Village Voices – 40  
Years of Rural Transformation in South India, Sage Publications.   
Jeffrey, C. (2001): A Fist is Stronger than Five Fingers: Caste and dominance in rural  
North-India, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 25(2): 1-30.      
Jeffrey, C., P. Jeffery and R. Jeffery (2007): Degrees without Freedom: Education,  
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Masculinities and Unemployment in North-India, Stanford University Press.  
Singh, K. S. (1982): People of India – An Introduction, Anthropological Survey of  
India.  
Srinivas, M. N. (1978): The remembered village, Oxford University Press.  
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Appendix 2  
Table A2.1 Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and demographic and locational controls 
Model: Social identity terms Plus village regime Plus agro-ecological zones Plus state dummies Plus demographic controls 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
Social identity:                     
SC -0.467 -16.32 -0.608 -18.43 -0.383 -8.21 -0.506 -10.15 -0.39 -8.49 -0.513 -10.27 -0.396 -8.53 -0.516 -10.25 -0.38 -8.58 -0.45 -9.45 
ST -0.461 -11.15 -0.602 -13.25 -0.316 -4.37 -0.461 -5.67 -0.302 -4.26 -0.422 -5.19 -0.302 -4.28 -0.441 -5.54 -0.315 -4.89 -0.373 -5.35 
OBC -0.271 -9.13 -0.372 -11.65 -0.296 -4.85 -0.31 -4.4 -0.276 -4.56 -0.297 -4.27 -0.272 -4.51 -0.289 -4.36 -0.231 -4.1 -0.241 -3.92 
MUS -0.41 -10.22 -0.53 -11.21 -0.294 -5.34 -0.445 -5.96 -0.275 -4.95 -0.438 -5.87 -0.283 -5.11 -0.465 -6.46 -0.208 -3.68 -0.323 -4.71 
Village regime:                                         
SC X DSC         0.037 0.49 0.265 2.74 0.103 1.37 0.257 2.7 0.117 1.57 0.281 2.92 0.145 2.04 0.299 3.06 
ST X DST         -0.088 -1.16 -0.05 -0.59 -0.056 -0.77 -0.018 -0.22 -0.05 -0.69 0.002 0.02 -0.018 -0.27 0.003 0.05 
OBC X DOBC         0.167 2.88 0.113 1.74 0.138 2.41 0.101 1.6 0.131 2.31 0.097 1.63 0.106 1.97 0.094 1.75 
MUS X DMUS         -0.023 -0.29 0.164 1.68 -0.064 -0.75 0.086 0.85 -0.053 -0.6 0.103 1.06 -0.016 -0.2 0.124 1.37 
UC X DUC         0.198 3.84 0.288 5.14 0.124 2.45 0.178 3.17 0.112 2.25 0.114 2.11 0.105 2.22 0.109 2.13 
SC X DUC         0.088 2.04 0.139 3.01 0.021 0.45 0.042 0.89 0.013 0.29 -0.02 -0.43 0.026 0.6 -0.024 -0.54 
ST X DUC         -0.02 -0.15 0.26 2.1 -0.105 -0.85 0.131 1.1 -0.095 -0.75 0.101 0.85 -0.023 -0.2 0.103 0.95 
OBC X DUC         0.176 2.85 0.156 2.32 0.084 1.35 0.05 0.74 0.068 1.11 -0.014 -0.22 0.032 0.55 -0.011 -0.18 
MUS X DUC         0.013 0.16 0.142 1.46 -0.086 -1.04 0.029 0.31 -0.068 -0.82 0.04 0.43 -0.037 -0.46 0.026 0.29 
Agro-ecological zones:                                         
aez2                 0.272 2.47 0.273 3.32 0.634 1.67 0.484 1.8 0.449 1.37 0.546 2.07 
aez3                 0.595 8.79 -0.202 -1.44 0.599 1.76 -0.103 -0.39 0.439 1.51 -0.15 -0.58 
aez4                 0.114 1.72 0.113 1.7 0.382 1.03 0.343 1.3 0.172 0.54 0.393 1.51 
aez5                 0.078 0.93 -0.206 -2.44 0.389 1.08 0.175 0.64 0.165 0.54 0.178 0.66 
aez6                 0.317 4.63 -0.054 -0.78 0.606 1.74 0.282 1.2 0.467 1.58 0.238 1.02 
aez7                 0.48 3.45 -0.009 -0.07 0.315 0.81 -0.183 -0.62 0.198 0.58 -0.167 -0.57 
aez8                 0.211 2.86 0.059 0.66 0.121 0.36 0.293 1.11 -0.065 -0.23 0.194 0.75 
aez9                 0.279 3.47 0.129 1.75 0.503 1.35 0.421 1.52 0.27 0.84 0.412 1.53 
aez10                 -0.019 -0.23 -0.297 -4.46 0.214 0.62 0.304 1.23 0.021 0.07 0.289 1.19 
aez11                 0.036 0.48 -0.116 -1.64 0.262 0.82 0.555 2.61 0.14 0.53 0.532 2.62 
aez12                 -0.285 -3.94 -0.384 -4.55 -0.043 -0.15 0.193 1.07 -0.165 -0.73 0.15 0.85 
 7
Model: Social identity terms Plus village regime Plus agro-ecological zones Plus state dummies Plus demographic controls 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
aez13                 -0.097 -0.94 -0.275 -2.42 0.07 0.17 0.268 0.89 -0.095 -0.27 0.283 0.98 
aez14                 -0.083 -1.06 0.229 2.96 0.338 0.86 0.296 1.05 0.066 0.2 0.278 1.01 
aez17                 -0.629 -2.33 -0.27 -1.1 -0.61 -2.25 -0.214 -0.9 -0.681 -2.42 -0.179 -0.83 
aez18                 -0.197 -2.73 0.374 5.26 -0.221 -0.65 0.446 1.94 -0.35 -1.21 0.418 1.86 
aez19                 -0.255 -1.73 -0.605 -4.41 0.032 0.1 0.121 0.54 -0.023 -0.09 0.059 0.27 
aez20                 0.253 1.94 0.176 1.18 0.23 0.66 0.167 0.66 0.02 0.07 0.081 0.32 
State dummy variables:                                         
Bihar                         -0.187 -0.82 -0.469 -2.11 -0.034 -0.15 -0.323 -1.5 
Gujarat                         -0.337 -1.87 -0.138 -0.66 -0.242 -1.4 -0.132 -0.64 
Haryana                         -0.083 -0.46 0.045 0.22 0.108 0.62 0.086 0.43 
Himachal Pradesh                         -0.486 -2.12 0.026 0.11 -0.278 -1.26 0.056 0.25 
Karnataka                         -0.544 -3.46 -0.273 -1.81 -0.407 -2.67 -0.114 -0.7 
Kerala                         0.143 0.49 0.597 2.39 0.227 0.76 0.562 2.32 
Madhya Pradesh                         -0.249 -1.71 -0.535 -3 -0.097 -0.69 -0.466 -2.61 
Maharashtra                         -0.318 -3.72 -0.266 -1.94 -0.258 -3.14 -0.209 -1.52 
Orissa                         -0.36 -2.08 -0.666 -4.76 -0.347 -2.03 -0.581 -4.07 
Punjab                         -0.252 -1.3 0.142 0.68 -0.097 -0.51 0.167 0.81 
Rajasthan                         -0.504 -2.84 -0.244 -1.19 -0.319 -1.85 -0.165 -0.82 
Tamil Nadu                         0.064 0.9 -0.21 -1.34 0.096 1.32 -0.145 -0.95 
Tripura                         . . . . . . . . 
 Uttar Pradesh                         -0.382 -2.02 -0.44 -2.1 -0.2 -1.09 -0.329 -1.61 
West Bengal                         -0.041 -0.13 0.031 0.16 -0.118 -0.44 0.034 0.17 
Uttaranchal                         -0.442 -1.63 -0.228 -0.99 -0.23 -0.86 -0.129 -0.56 
Chattisgarh                         -0.264 -1.45 -0.629 -3.92 -0.225 -1.24 -0.567 -3.55 
Jharkhand                         -0.028 -0.14 -0.145 -0.76 0.046 0.24 -0.129 -0.72 
Demographic controls                                         
Sex of hh head (male = 1)                                 0.03 1.46 -0.012 -0.53 
# males aged 0-5                                 -0.146 -12.63 -0.179 -13.83 
# males aged 6-14                                 -0.112 -11.94 -0.142 -15.13 
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Model: Social identity terms Plus village regime Plus agro-ecological zones Plus state dummies Plus demographic controls 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
# males aged 15-19                                 -0.006 -0.45 -0.036 -2.63 
#   males, aged 20-24                                 0.073 4.72 0.06 3.94 
#   males, aged 25-49                                 0.104 5.76 0.108 6.64 
#   males, aged 50-59                                 0.176 7.76 0.136 5.82 
#   males, aged 60 +                                  0.074 3.42 0.056 2.7 
# females, aged 0-5                                 -0.13 -12.3 -0.154 -11.57 
# females, aged 6-14                                 -0.116 -13.64 -0.134 -13.65 
# females, aged 15-19                                 -0.065 -4.43 -0.089 -7.31 
# females, aged 20-24                                 -0.016 -0.8 -0.015 -0.84 
# females, aged 25-49                                 0.07 3.41 0.09 4.81 
# females, aged 50-59                                 0 0.01 0.099 3.88 
# females, aged 60 +                                  0.014 0.59 -0.031 -1.37 
# of couples in household                                 -0.021 -1.25 0.05 2.99 
Constant 8.961 341.8 9.193 320.64 8.836 228.83 9.007 210.91 8.792 143.24 9.092 144.46 8.82 25.98 9.036 39.74 8.948 31.24 8.938 38.92 
R squared  0.062    0.095    0.067   0.107    0.115    0.162     0.137   0.200     0.212    0.284   
N 9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   
Source: HDPI-I (“round 1”) and II (“round 2”) surveys, panel households only; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual per capita household income in constant 1993/94 prices, with round 2 figures converted using NSSO state-specific rural CPIs. Random effects, with 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering within villages; robust t-statistics are reported. 
 9
Table A2.2 Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and additional controls: village infrastructure, 
household education and land 
Controls added: Village infrastructure Plus education Plus land 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t 
Social identity:             
SC -0.378 -8.53 -0.447 -9.4 -0.255 -6.17 -0.316 -7.18 -0.166 -4.27 -0.248 -6.06 
ST -0.317 -4.92 -0.372 -5.34 -0.177 -2.85 -0.232 -3.49 -0.157 -2.73 -0.202 -3.08 
OBC -0.226 -3.95 -0.235 -3.83 -0.154 -2.85 -0.159 -2.83 -0.136 -2.81 -0.128 -2.62 
MUS -0.215 -3.86 -0.323 -4.67 -0.119 -2.17 -0.216 -3.31 -0.07 -1.38 -0.138 -2.22 
Village regime:                         
SC X DSC 0.135 1.95 0.285 2.92 0.129 2.01 0.249 2.7 0.067 1.09 0.202 2.41 
ST X DST 0.006 0.09 0.024 0.35 -0.008 -0.12 0.009 0.14 0.012 0.21 -0.009 -0.14 
OBC X DOBC 0.104 1.91 0.09 1.68 0.101 1.94 0.074 1.5 0.067 1.51 0.03 0.68 
MUS X DMUS 0.003 0.03 0.149 1.65 0.005 0.07 0.152 1.8 -0.047 -0.74 0.088 1.15 
UC X DUC 0.112 2.39 0.11 2.12 0.12 2.66 0.108 2.16 0.032 0.79 0.026 0.56 
SC X DUC 0.026 0.6 -0.028 -0.64 0.015 0.38 -0.041 -0.98 0.044 1.18 -0.018 -0.46 
ST X DUC -0.025 -0.21 0.101 0.92 -0.006 -0.05 0.124 1.24 0.003 0.04 0.138 1.51 
OBC X DUC 0.026 0.43 -0.018 -0.31 0.039 0.69 -0.01 -0.18 0.111 2.25 0.023 0.49 
MUS X DUC -0.034 -0.43 0.012 0.13 -0.004 -0.05 0.05 0.54 0.062 0.83 0.026 0.3 
Agro-ecological zones:                         
aez2 0.167 0.53 0.369 1.24 0.176 0.59 0.32 1.25 -0.021 -0.08 0.245 0.93 
aez3 0.415 1.54 -0.291 -0.96 0.358 1.38 -0.31 -1.13 0.141 0.62 -0.33 -1.24 
aez4 -0.101 -0.33 0.196 0.66 -0.139 -0.48 0.111 0.44 -0.189 -0.73 0.142 0.55 
aez5 -0.073 -0.25 0.011 0.04 -0.055 -0.2 -0.049 -0.19 -0.169 -0.69 -0.043 -0.17 
aez6 0.325 1.18 0.115 0.42 0.352 1.34 0.081 0.35 0.242 1.03 0.044 0.19 
aez7 0.14 0.45 -0.321 -1.01 0.217 0.71 -0.276 -1.02 0.036 0.13 -0.302 -1.12 
aez8 -0.04 -0.15 0.074 0.25 0.016 0.06 0.095 0.37 -0.127 -0.55 0.089 0.34 
aez9 0.033 0.11 0.214 0.7 -0.002 -0.01 0.091 0.34 -0.041 -0.16 0.156 0.58 
aez10 -0.149 -0.53 0.13 0.46 -0.206 -0.77 0.004 0.01 -0.256 -1.08 0.029 0.12 
aez11 0.044 0.17 0.289 1.16 0.029 0.12 0.249 1.17 -0.114 -0.56 0.199 0.9 
aez12 -0.123 -0.57 -0.001 -0.01 -0.074 -0.37 0.038 0.21 -0.176 -1.02 0.004 0.02 
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Controls added: Village infrastructure Plus education Plus land 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t 
aez13 -0.359 -1.05 0.084 0.26 -0.289 -0.88 -0.029 -0.1 -0.143 -0.5 0.093 0.33 
aez14 -0.135 -0.41 0.087 0.28 -0.287 -0.9 -0.094 -0.34 -0.171 -0.61 0.045 0.17 
aez17 -0.543 -2.68 -0.133 -0.67 -0.511 -2.59 -0.15 -0.79 -0.408 -1.9 -0.106 -0.58 
aez18 -0.304 -1.16 0.238 0.89 -0.263 -1.04 0.243 1.06 -0.306 -1.35 0.182 0.78 
aez19 -0.025 -0.1 -0.069 -0.27 0.029 0.12 -0.026 -0.12 -0.069 -0.33 -0.001 0 
aez20 -0.023 -0.08 -0.056 -0.19 -0.069 -0.26 -0.123 -0.49 -0.078 -0.32 -0.055 -0.22 
State dummy variables:                         
Bihar 0.168 0.72 -0.26 -1.19 0.163 0.72 -0.157 -0.8 -0.145 -0.74 -0.25 -1.33 
Gujarat -0.045 -0.25 -0.089 -0.43 0.022 0.12 0.012 0.07 0.003 0.02 -0.067 -0.4 
Haryana 0.313 1.72 0.119 0.58 0.4 2.2 0.219 1.22 0.225 1.37 0.17 1.01 
Himachal Pradesh -0.035 -0.16 0.114 0.5 0.124 0.55 0.239 1.14 0.014 0.07 0.207 1.08 
Karnataka -0.342 -2.28 -0.106 -0.63 -0.284 -1.94 -0.09 -0.57 -0.342 -2.28 -0.104 -0.65 
Kerala 0.242 0.82 0.499 1.89 0.25 0.89 0.435 1.81 0.254 0.93 0.439 1.94 
Madhya Pradesh 0.184 1.19 -0.409 -2.23 0.292 1.86 -0.264 -1.7 0.099 0.7 -0.362 -2.45 
Maharashtra -0.167 -1.83 -0.22 -1.54 -0.143 -1.39 -0.215 -1.71 -0.183 -2.03 -0.226 -2.09 
Orissa -0.297 -1.93 -0.58 -4.01 -0.268 -1.66 -0.577 -4.48 -0.265 -1.82 -0.536 -4.37 
Punjab 0.081 0.42 0.207 0.99 0.181 0.94 0.298 1.61 -0.059 -0.34 0.221 1.28 
Rajasthan -0.085 -0.47 -0.105 -0.52 0.023 0.13 0.016 0.09 -0.094 -0.58 -0.061 -0.37 
Tamil Nadu 0.038 0.44 -0.165 -1.05 0.008 0.1 -0.206 -1.37 0.033 0.42 -0.214 -1.51 
Tripura  . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Uttar Pradesh 0.024 0.13 -0.276 -1.33 0.122 0.64 -0.17 -0.93 -0.016 -0.09 -0.231 -1.34 
West Bengal -0.148 -0.61 -0.113 -0.47 -0.086 -0.37 -0.068 -0.34 -0.203 -0.98 -0.06 -0.29 
Uttaranchal 0.018 0.07 -0.066 -0.28 0.188 0.75 0.116 0.53 -0.037 -0.17 0.005 0.02 
Chattisgarh -0.109 -0.65 -0.455 -2.67 -0.03 -0.17 -0.39 -2.56 -0.008 -0.05 -0.372 -2.55 
Jharkhand 0.043 0.25 -0.083 -0.46 0.058 0.33 -0.086 -0.51 0.08 0.49 -0.005 -0.03 
Demographic controls:                         
Sex of hh head (male = 1) 0.03 1.46 -0.013 -0.57 0.037 1.87 -0.015 -0.67 0.038 2.09 -0.02 -0.92 
# males aged 0-5 -0.145 -12.58 -0.178 -13.75 -0.138 -12.4 -0.16 -13.26 -0.149 -15.44 -0.15 -13.33 
# males aged 6-14 -0.112 -11.91 -0.141 -15.03 -0.102 -11.58 -0.114 -12.47 -0.125 -15.59 -0.125 -14.69 
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Controls added: Village infrastructure Plus education Plus land 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t 
# males aged 15-19 -0.006 -0.48 -0.035 -2.61 -0.047 -3.61 -0.073 -5.33 -0.077 -6.53 -0.094 -7.25 
#   males, aged 20-24 0.073 4.69 0.06 3.98 0.012 0.78 -0.014 -0.98 -0.01 -0.73 -0.032 -2.22 
#   males, aged 25-49 0.103 5.74 0.108 6.64 0.041 2.4 0.01 0.61 0.013 0.86 -0.011 -0.75 
#   males, aged 50-59 0.178 7.81 0.135 5.81 0.115 5.08 0.065 2.87 0.058 2.91 0.031 1.5 
#   males, aged 60 +  0.075 3.45 0.056 2.71 0.028 1.33 0.003 0.14 -0.031 -1.73 -0.037 -1.95 
# females, aged 0-5 -0.131 -12.33 -0.153 -11.53 -0.123 -12.13 -0.135 -10.7 -0.132 -14.67 -0.137 -11.81 
# females, aged 6-14 -0.116 -13.6 -0.134 -13.69 -0.111 -13.53 -0.116 -12.59 -0.128 -17.11 -0.13 -15.1 
# females, aged 15-19 -0.066 -4.49 -0.089 -7.32 -0.13 -8.32 -0.135 -10.42 -0.134 -9.71 -0.145 -10.6 
# females, aged 20-24 -0.018 -0.87 -0.017 -0.93 -0.092 -4.53 -0.102 -5.48 -0.102 -5.62 -0.111 -6.5 
# females, aged 25-49 0.067 3.31 0.088 4.71 -0.005 -0.25 -0.007 -0.36 -0.036 -1.97 -0.045 -2.51 
# females, aged 50-59 -0.002 -0.1 0.097 3.81 -0.055 -2.41 0.007 0.28 -0.075 -3.9 -0.021 -0.85 
# females, aged 60 +  0.011 0.47 -0.033 -1.49 -0.042 -1.86 -0.104 -4.7 -0.077 -3.85 -0.13 -6.25 
# of couples in household -0.019 -1.14 0.051 3.07 0.026 1.6 0.106 6.49 0.007 0.46 0.067 4.47 
Village infrastructure:                         
Ln(village population) 0.018 0.96 -0.006 -0.38 0.007 0.4 -0.012 -0.79 0.012 0.74 -0.009 -0.6 
School access:                         
Primary 0.008 0.08 0.363 1.55 -0.015 -0.13 0.274 2.35 -0.009 -0.1 0.305 2 
Middle -0.196 -2.95 -0.126 -1.81 -0.185 -2.8 -0.05 -0.73 -0.125 -2.14 -0.064 -0.98 
Lower secondary 0.045 0.73 -0.095 -1.56 0.059 0.97 -0.032 -0.55 0.064 1.13 -0.077 -1.35 
Higher secondary -0.012 -0.3 -0.072 -1.32 -0.005 -0.12 -0.041 -0.78 -0.023 -0.64 -0.056 -1.07 
Graduate -0.019 -0.52 -0.068 -1.32 -0.021 -0.59 -0.036 -0.71 -0.02 -0.64 -0.048 -0.97 
Vocational -0.017 -0.39 -0.025 -0.4 -0.043 -1.03 -0.011 -0.18 -0.002 -0.06 -0.018 -0.29 
Medical access:                         
Doctor 0 -0.23 -0.003 -1.56 0 -0.06 -0.002 -1.31 -0.001 -0.78 -0.002 -1.42 
Clinic -0.019 -0.58 -0.03 -0.95 -0.039 -1.19 -0.032 -1.04 -0.029 -1.01 -0.013 -0.45 
Road access:                         
Feeder 0.07 1.35 -0.013 -0.22 0.065 1.28 -0.019 -0.33 0.04 0.83 -0.018 -0.33 
Tarmac 0.114 2.05 0.008 0.13 0.099 1.81 -0.004 -0.07 0.077 1.52 -0.008 -0.15 
Bus stop 0.018 0.48 0.002 0.08 0.016 0.44 0.009 0.32 0.012 0.36 0.012 0.44 
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Controls added: Village infrastructure Plus education Plus land 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t 
Railway station 0.106 2.43 0.103 2.51 0.07 1.52 0.066 1.61 0.074 1.9 0.055 1.43 
Post office 0.112 3.16 0.027 0.82 0.108 3.1 0.013 0.42 0.11 3.46 0.015 0.52 
Bank/credit market -0.048 -1.39 -0.012 -0.34 -0.055 -1.65 -0.048 -1.41 -0.027 -0.89 -0.022 -0.69 
Market/mandi -0.068 -2.01 0.002 0.06 -0.077 -2.28 0.005 0.17 -0.064 -2.1 0.013 0.48 
Max. educational achievement in the 
household (of those 15+):                         
Males                         
Up to primary         0.08 4.23 0.035 1.58 0.066 3.95 0.042 1.99 
Middle         0.177 8.14 0.129 6.1 0.143 7.46 0.13 6.59 
Matriculation         0.272 9.5 0.31 10.9 0.206 8.21 0.287 10.43 
Higher secondary         0.341 9.97 0.365 11.67 0.278 9.1 0.312 10.08 
Graduate and above         0.582 13.88 0.608 15.76 0.455 11.84 0.513 14.08 
Females                         
Up to primary         0.083 3.76 0.087 3.98 0.061 3.23 0.071 3.45 
Middle         0.191 6.52 0.116 5.15 0.138 5.27 0.087 4.15 
Matriculation         0.246 6.39 0.149 4.88 0.162 4.59 0.14 4.91 
Higher secondary         0.192 2.98 0.329 8.05 0.212 3.43 0.262 6.58 
Graduate and above         0.264 2.89 0.335 6.47 0.289 3.55 0.286 5.92 
Household land:                         
Land owned in acres                 0.022 5.37 0.029 6.85 
Land gross irrigated in acres                 0.047 10.36 0.036 4.78 
Constant 8.75 28.5 9.203 28.92 8.655 28.99 9.073 32.86 8.811 33.22 9.154 33.12 
R squared 0.225    0.288    0.270    0.341    0.426    0.418    
N 9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   9108   
Source and Notes: as for Table A2.1 
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Table A2.3 Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and additional controls: by social group 
 
Model: SC ST OBC MUS UC 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
Village regime:                     
DSC 0.025 0.29 0.3 2.93                 
DST     -0.01 -0.13 0.022 0.31             
DOBC         0.11 1.84 0.079 1.71         
DMUS             0.07 0.7 0.151 1.3     
DUC -0.011 -0.26 0.025 0.55 -0.067 -0.51 0.111 0.87 0 0 -0.062 -1.22 0.098 1.03 0.105 0.91 0.074 1.42 0.059 1.06 
Agro-ecological zones:                     
aez2 -0.296 -0.66 -0.711 -1.62 1.318 0.63 -1.711 -0.68 -0.087 -0.14 1.027 1.38 2.044 1.9 0.545 0.44 0.702 0.64 0.366 0.33 
aez3 -0.367 -1.04 -1.044 -2.7 1.379 0.68 -2.176 -0.81 0.086 0.14 0.57 0.76 1.395 2.14 -0.509 -0.7 1.432 1.87 0.835 1.05 
aez4 -0.552 -1.24 -0.71 -1.62 0.975 0.48 -2.409 -0.97 -0.387 -0.62 0.698 0.94 1.445 1.39 1.05 0.88 0.559 0.51 0.314 0.28 
aez5 -0.506 -1.17 -0.792 -1.81 1.048 0.52 -2.058 -0.84 -0.385 -0.62 0.813 1.07 1.503 1.42 0.857 0.8 0.296 0.27 -0.366 -0.32 
aez6 -0.462 -1.22 -0.797 -2.13 1.015 0.51 -2.077 -0.86 0.049 0.08 0.83 1.14 1.869 2.37 0.811 0.81 1.956 2.39 1.002 1.22 
aez7 -0.741 -1.71 -1.342 -2.8 0.142 0.07 -1.667 -0.58 -0.296 -0.46 0.51 0.66 1.07 1.53 0.113 0.15 1.865 2.3 0.858 1.14 
aez8 -0.879 -2.52 -0.461 -1.21 1.099 0.54 -1.632 -0.61 -0.53 -0.85 0.507 0.66 1.195 2.08 1.268 1.7 1.247 1.63 1.148 1.59 
aez9 -0.454 -1.04 -0.632 -1.43 3.137 1.29 5.653 2.14 -0.279 -0.44 0.764 1.02 1.563 1.44 1.012 0.83 0.504 0.46 0.219 0.19 
aez10 -0.763 -1.86 -0.587 -1.4 0.808 0.41 -2.222 -0.91 -0.562 -0.93 0.695 0.95 2.089 2.03 1.226 1.09 0.416 0.39 -0.048 -0.04 
aez11 -0.78 -2.37 0.139 0.43 1.122 0.57 -1.964 -0.82 -0.372 -0.64 0.804 1.14 0.32 0.46 0.335 0.56 0.113 0.11 0.533 0.35 
aez12 -0.93 -3.18 -0.294 -1.11 0.547 0.28 -2.497 -1.05 -0.406 -0.74 0.405 0.58 0.196 0.51 0.148 0.36 1.024 1.52 1.417 2.11 
aez13 -0.52 -1.04 -0.958 -2.05 0 . 0 . -0.833 -1.21 0.642 0.84 1.121 1.03 0.921 0.74 0.134 0.12 -0.002 0 
aez14 -0.69 -1.45 -0.56 -1.24 0.658 0.32 -1.692 -0.63 -0.516 -0.81 0.621 0.82 2.22 2.1 1.058 0.86 0.448 0.4 0.028 0.02 
aez17 -0.422 -2.78 -0.129 -0.75 -1.718 -2.06 -0.124 -0.11 -0.491 -1.2 -0.303 -0.64 0.001 0 0.509 1.92 -1.092 -2.64 -0.301 -0.69 
aez18 -1.073 -3.12 -0.293 -0.82 0 . 0 . -0.758 -1.25 1.12 1.52 -0.098 -0.12 1.031 1.46 0.823 1.08 0.786 1.07 
aez19 -0.826 -2.6 -0.239 -0.77 0.565 0.23 -3.907 -1.23 -0.194 -0.3 0.574 0.79 -0.053 -0.11 -0.045 -0.1 0.923 1.35 0.735 1.05 
aez20 -0.814 -1.97 -0.232 -0.56 -3.358 -0.46 -10.469 -1.43 -0.551 -0.9 0.45 0.6 1.394 1.74 1.449 1.5 1.756 2.16 0.772 0.94 
State dummy variables:                     
Bihar -0.417 -1.15 0.057 0.17 0 . 0 . 0.185 0.52 -0.128 -0.44 0.056 0.06 -0.809 -0.96 1.194 1.48 0.81 0.92 
Gujarat -0.33 -1.13 -0.036 -0.11 -0.66 -1.58 -0.277 -0.34 -0.055 -0.23 0.019 0.07 -0.615 -0.73 -0.713 -0.86 0.924 1.16 1.252 1.47 
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Model: SC ST OBC MUS UC 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
Haryana -0.129 -0.46 0.161 0.5 0 . 0 . 0.343 1.53 0.39 1.5 -0.258 -0.31 -0.536 -0.64 1.182 1.48 1.201 1.41 
Himachal Pradesh -0.263 -0.8 0.109 0.32 0 . 0 . 0.11 0.36 0.585 1.75 -0.94 -1.05 -0.234 -0.26 0.655 0.8 1.136 1.29 
Karnataka -0.6 -1.89 0.305 1.71 0.152 0.56 -0.295 -0.37 -0.651 -1.28 0.031 0.14 -0.344 -1.03 -0.451 -1.11 -0.608 -1.79 -0.335 -0.75 
Kerala 0.4 1.4 0.209 0.37 0 . 0 . 0.202 0.4 0.448 1.58 -0.179 -0.26 -0.278 -0.46 -0.343 -0.78 0.527 1.24 
Madhya Pradesh -0.28 -1.22 -0.499 -1.72 -0.295 -0.86 -0.247 -0.31 -0.014 -0.07 -0.233 -1.03 -0.737 -0.93 -1.168 -1.67 1.039 1.34 0.804 0.97 
Maharashtra -0.264 -1.8 0.047 0.26 -0.325 -1.26 -0.078 -0.1 -0.171 -1.32 -0.073 -0.42 -0.696 -2.06 -0.48 -1.2 -0.323 -1.03 -0.121 -0.28 
Orissa -0.399 -2.12 -0.974 -4.02 -0.577 -1.76 -0.206 -0.25 -0.542 -2.25 -0.281 -1.27 1.436 3.18 0.253 0.45 -0.088 -0.27 -0.728 -3.05 
Punjab -0.228 -0.79 0.29 0.9 0 . 0 . -0.011 -0.05 0.324 1.19 -0.856 -0.96 -0.928 -1.11 1.06 1.32 1.333 1.56 
Rajasthan -0.369 -1.36 0.139 0.44 -0.573 -1.13 0.222 0.25 -0.191 -0.86 0.123 0.48 -0.459 -0.54 -0.349 -0.41 0.611 0.77 0.771 0.91 
Tamil Nadu 0.062 0.56 -0.251 -1.52 -1.797 -5.66 -0.929 -4.95 0.107 0.63 0.108 0.4 -0.294 -1.52 -0.761 -2.24 0.08 0.36 -0.488 -2.14 
Tripura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Uttar Pradesh -0.436 -1.4 -0.134 -0.42 0.509 1.1 0.656 0.75 -0.209 -0.84 -0.072 -0.28 -0.425 -0.49 -0.71 -0.87 0.97 1.22 0.566 0.66 
West Bengal -0.844 -2.76 -0.683 -2.12 1.03 0.51 -2.271 -0.85 -0.443 -0.78 0.624 0.92 0.904 1.62 0.13 0.19 1.112 1.55 0.775 1.17 
Uttaranchal -0.362 -1.05 -0.202 -0.59 0 . 0 . -0.013 -0.04 0.299 0.85 -0.292 -0.34 -0.069 -0.08 0.803 0.92 0.916 0.99 
Chattisgarh -0.055 -0.23 -0.893 -3.12 -0.528 -1.59 -0.236 -0.28 -0.243 -1 -0.282 -1.29 0.761 1.06 -0.535 -0.62 0.98 1.33 0.038 0.03 
Jharkhand 0.39 1.91 -0.88 -2.59 -0.34 -1.02 0.096 0.11 -0.252 -0.9 0.114 0.37 0.867 1.73 0.118 0.19 0.648 1.65 -0.169 -0.66 
Demographic controls 0.024 0.62 0.073 1.67 0.026 0.4 -0.043 -0.57 0.042 1.09 -0.002 -0.05 0.061 1.04 -0.021 -0.23 0.022 0.48 -0.087 -1.93 
Sex of hh head (male = 1)                     
# males aged 0-5 -0.155 -7.35 -0.143 -5.47 -0.184 -5.61 -0.263 -5.89 -0.153 -7.34 -0.171 -7.64 -0.135 -4.39 -0.146 -3.68 -0.132 -5.64 -0.183 -7.29 
# males aged 6-14 -0.119 -7.22 -0.122 -6.31 -0.114 -4.31 -0.185 -7.68 -0.111 -6.55 -0.152 -9 -0.136 -4.42 -0.079 -3.43 -0.1 -5.06 -0.145 -7.17 
# males aged 15-19 0.01 0.36 -0.043 -1.83 0.008 0.21 -0.071 -2.01 -0.003 -0.15 0.014 0.56 0.026 0.46 -0.084 -2.23 -0.028 -1.16 -0.046 -1.6 
#   males, aged 20-24 0.112 4.02 0.092 3.46 0.086 1.62 0.047 0.87 0.052 1.97 0.044 1.44 0.032 0.76 0.084 1.4 0.049 1.55 0.048 1.48 
#   males, aged 25-49 0.145 4.06 0.148 4.75 0.05 0.9 0.057 1 0.121 3.74 0.139 5.11 0.012 0.25 0.164 3.04 0.067 1.8 0.025 0.89 
#   males, aged 50-59 0.214 5.05 0.18 4.33 0.085 1.05 0.087 1.19 0.193 4.87 0.176 4.51 0.026 0.29 0.089 0.95 0.156 3.15 0.037 0.86 
#   males, aged 60 +  0.078 2.07 -0.009 -0.22 0.086 1.08 0.066 0.91 0.128 3.47 0.082 2.29 -0.06 -0.75 0.197 2.63 0.038 0.92 0.012 0.32 
# females, aged 0-5 -0.12 -6.45 -0.149 -6.19 -0.158 -4.59 -0.165 -5.44 -0.125 -6.33 -0.153 -7.19 -0.12 -4.11 -0.175 -3.36 -0.148 -6.91 -0.131 -4.65 
# females, aged 6-14 -0.132 -7.94 -0.155 -9.65 -0.11 -3.45 -0.157 -6.46 -0.106 -6.73 -0.131 -7.89 -0.101 -4.34 -0.085 -2.4 -0.119 -6.62 -0.123 -6.46 
# females, aged 15-19 -0.023 -0.85 -0.057 -2.46 -0.139 -2.48 -0.068 -1.82 -0.067 -2.36 -0.101 -3.99 -0.096 -1.77 -0.109 -3.05 -0.037 -1.28 -0.082 -3.07 
# females, aged 20-24 -0.014 -0.34 -0.012 -0.3 -0.103 -1.54 -0.032 -0.53 -0.045 -1.26 0.013 0.4 -0.001 -0.01 -0.08 -1.36 0.041 1.13 -0.021 -0.58 
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Model: SC ST OBC MUS UC 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
 b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t b t 
# females, aged 25-49 0.063 1.52 -0.025 -0.58 0.006 0.1 0 0 0.066 1.84 0.131 4.16 0.031 0.36 0.017 0.21 0.091 2.14 0.133 3.49 
# females, aged 50-59 -0.066 -1.52 0.011 0.23 -0.012 -0.15 0.041 0.61 0.002 0.04 0.123 2.63 0.056 0.74 0.098 0.88 0.067 1.45 0.127 2.41 
# females, aged 60 +  -0.062 -1.29 0.021 0.48 -0.019 -0.23 -0.077 -1.13 -0.011 -0.24 -0.015 -0.32 0.023 0.29 -0.131 -1.52 0.079 1.77 -0.055 -1.2 
# of couples in household -0.043 -1.29 -0.001 -0.03 0.033 0.56 0.068 1.27 -0.029 -1.02 0.021 0.68 0.027 0.5 0.084 1.89 -0.027 -0.73 0.09 2.41 
Constant 9.46 27.36 9.35 25.71 8.182 4.14 11.043 4.13 9.131 14.9 8.027 10.86 7.622 13.74 8.323 11.94 7.594 10.09 8.189 11.49 
R squared 0.180  0.267  0.225  0.328  0.176  0.226  0.229  0.228  0.196  0.226  
N 2252  2252  835  835  2909  2909  699  699  2413  2413  
 
Source and Notes: as for Table A2.1 
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Table A2.4 Estimation results of the effects on change in land/education of social identity, village regime and additional controls 
Model: 
Change in land owned
Change in highest level 
of female education 
(probit)
Change in highest level 
of male education 
(probit) 
 b t b z b z 
       
       
Social identity:       
SC 0.237 0.73 -0.875 -9.43 -0.704 -7.61 
ST 0.548 0.97 -0.913 -7.59 -0.771 -5.96 
OBC -1.055 -1.72 -0.373 -3.17 -0.327 -3 
MUS -0.63 -1.18 -0.667 -4.61 -0.575 -4.08 
Village regime:       
SC X DSC -0.176 -0.81 0.187 1.09 0.198 1.29 
ST X DST -0.084 -0.15 -0.142 -1.16 -0.241 -1.79 
OBC X DOBC 0.966 1.78 -0.004 -0.04 0.016 0.17 
MUS X DMUS 0.327 0.63 -0.385 -1.95 -0.228 -1.16 
UC X DUC -0.186 -0.51 -0.096 -1 -0.099 -1.01 
SC X DUC -0.321 -0.94 0.092 1.1 -0.014 -0.16 
ST X DUC -0.369 -0.61 -0.176 -0.69 -0.304 -1.49 
OBC X DUC 1.042 1.81 -0.14 -1.22 -0.244 -2.16 
MUS X DUC 1.142 2.3 -0.37 -1.29 -0.207 -1.16 
Agro-ecological zones:       
aez2 -3.636 -2.04 0.093 0.13 -0.177 -0.27 
aez3 -1.402 -1.13 -0.498 -0.73 -0.457 -0.77 
aez4 -2.253 -1.37 0.172 0.25 0.009 0.01 
aez5 -3.22 -1.98 -0.016 -0.02 -0.582 -0.89 
aez6 -1.52 -1.37 -0.421 -0.61 -0.764 -1.2 
aez7 -1.83 -1.58 -0.656 -0.85 -1.151 -1.5 
aez8 -1.494 -1.48 -0.419 -0.63 -0.547 -0.93 
aez9 -3.284 -1.93 0.611 0.86 0.192 0.28 
aez10 -1.448 -0.98 0.675 0.99 -0.089 -0.14 
aez11 -1.784 -0.89 0.577 0.88 0.441 0.76 
aez12 0.276 0.42 -0.589 -0.98 -0.59 -1.2 
aez13 -2.601 -1.46 0.417 0.54 -0.165 -0.21 
aez14 -3.38 -2.03 0.982 1.34 0.28 0.38 
aez17 0.553 2.19 -0.387 -0.99 0.127 0.39 
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aez18 1.006 0.94 0.348 0.52 0.01 0.02 
aez19 -0.984 -1.01 -0.234 -0.38 -0.066 -0.12 
aez20 -1.888 -1.7 0.342 0.48 -0.677 -1.07 
State dummy variables:       
Bihar 0.892 0.63 -0.955 -2.04 -0.559 -1.03 
Gujarat 1.393 1.08 -0.555 -1.48 0.069 0.17 
Haryana 1.232 0.98 -0.733 -1.97 -0.34 -0.82 
Himachal Pradesh 1.625 1.24 -1.019 -2.35 -0.247 -0.46 
Karnataka 2.098 1.67 0.496 1.67 0.411 1.07 
Kerala 0.656 0.94 0.867 1.92 1.901 4 
Madhya Pradesh -0.451 -0.42 -1.253 -3.79 -0.354 -0.94 
Maharashtra -0.191 -0.27 0.325 1.26 0.541 1.88 
Orissa -1.697 -2.58 0.096 0.36 -0.014 -0.05 
Punjab 1.809 1.41 -0.566 -1.5 -0.504 -1.2 
Rajasthan 0.427 0.34 -1.387 -3.71 -0.588 -1.44 
Tamil Nadu 0.675 1.62 0.275 1.5 0.116 0.73 
Tripura . . . . . . 
 Uttar Pradesh 1.704 1.33 -1.072 -2.9 -0.739 -1.79 
West Bengal -1.323 -1.47 -0.142 -0.24 -0.611 -1.13 
Uttaranchal 2.158 1.63 -1.309 -3.17 -0.504 -0.98 
Chattisgarh 0.25 0.18 -1.028 -3.18 -0.916 -2.35 
Jharkhand -2.884 -2.85 -0.485 -1.62 -0.314 -0.94 
Demographic controls       
Sex of hh head (male = 1) 0.238 1.27 0.038 0.82 -0.06 -1.18 
# males aged 0-5 0.058 0.52 -0.154 -5.09 -0.111 -3.3 
# males aged 6-14 0.119 1.32 -0.128 -5.71 -0.104 -4.59 
# males aged 15-19 0.011 0.08 -0.143 -5.05 0.661 15.96 
#   males, aged 20-24 0.179 0.91 -0.021 -0.62 0.673 13.04 
#   males, aged 25-49 0.079 0.59 0.259 7.59 0.865 17.31 
#   males, aged 50-59 0.404 1.48 0.111 2.33 0.625 10.68 
#   males, aged 60 +  0.153 0.89 0.209 4.94 0.449 9.71 
# females, aged 0-5 0.199 1.69 -0.153 -5.41 -0.109 -3.22 
# females, aged 6-14 -0.082 -0.85 -0.083 -4.24 -0.031 -1.47 
# females, aged 15-19 0.074 0.5 0.794 19.24 0.017 0.6 
# females, aged 20-24 0.095 0.43 0.89 17.99 0.222 5.07 
# females, aged 25-49 0.466 2.53 0.887 19.04 0.399 8.74 
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# females, aged 50-59 0.318 1.5 0.601 10.64 0.334 5.69 
# females, aged 60 +  0.271 1.33 0.446 8.8 0.272 5.19 
# of couples in household -0.007 -0.03 -0.328 -8.25 -0.212 -5.44 
Constant -0.32 -0.29 -0.2 -0.31 0.303 0.51 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.0211  0.2655  0.2464  
N 9108  9108  9108  
       
Source and Notes: as for Table A2.1 
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Appendix 3   Derivation of equation (4) and interpretation 
  
The household group, enclave, oppression and proximity effects are not all separately 
identified and to facilitate the interpretation of our empirical results, this appendix show what 
is identified and how to interpret the estimated coefficients.  
The parameter notation is as follows. The α’s are household group effects, the β’s are 
enclave effects, the γ’s are oppression effects and the δ’s are proximity effects. Oppression 
effects and proximity effects are with respect to UC dominated villages and, therefore, for UC 
households, by definition, equal to zero, i.e. we set 5 0t   and 5 0t   (see also main text). 
To start with, we include all possible effects in the income equation. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5ln( )ht t t h t h t h t h t hY SC ST MUS OBC UC            
1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )
4 ( ) 5 ( )
t h v h t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DSC ST DST MUS DMUS
OBC DOBC UC DUC
     
   
  
 
1 ( ) 2 ( )
3 ( ) 4 ( )
t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DUC ST DUC
MUS DUC OBC DUC
 
 
   
   
1 ( ) 2 ( )
3 ( ) 4 ( )
t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DUC ST DUC
MUS DUC OBC DUC
 
 
   
     
( )t ht h v h htX             (A1) 
As in the main text other explanatory variables are denoted by htX and the error terms by 
( ), and h v h ht   . Next, we simplify the rows of eq.(A1) that correspond to the oppression and 
proximity effects as these cannot, at the outset, be separately identified for all household 
groups (as pointed out by the referee and the Associate Editor, only the net effects can). 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5ln( )ht t t h t h t h t h t hY SC ST MUS OBC UC            
1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )
4 ( ) 5 ( )
t h v h t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DSC ST DST MUS DMUS
OBC DOBC UC DUC
     
   
  
    (A2) 
1 1 ( ) 2 2 ( )
3 3 ( ) 4 4 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t h v h t t h v h
t t h v h t t h v h
SC DUC ST DUC
MUS DUC OBC DUC
   
   
     
       
( )t ht h v h htX        
 
Finally, since 1h h h h hSC ST MUS OBC UC     , we substitute 
1 ( )h h h h hUC SC ST MUS OBC      in eq.(A2) and, after  rearranging terms, this yields 
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0 5 1 5 2 5ln( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ht t t t t h t t hY SC ST            
3 5 4 5( ) ( )t t h t t hMUS OBC        
1 ( ) 2 ( )
3 ( ) 4 ( )
t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DSC ST DST
MUS DMUS OBC DOBC
   
   
 
     (A3) 
5 ( )
1 1 5 ( ) 2 2 5 ( )
3 3 5 ( ) 4 4 5 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t v h
t t t h v h t t t h v h
t t t h v h t t t h v h
DUC
SC DUC ST DUC
MUS DUC OBC DUC

     
     
 
       
       
 ( )t ht h v h htX       .   
 
This is the specification in the previous version of our paper which we use in the simulations 
of the order of magnitude of the enclave, proximity and oppression effects in section IV.C: 
the interpretation of the coefficients corresponding with the DUC interactions includes 
enclave, oppression and proximity effects. In the previous version of the paper, we treated 
proximity effects as undifferentiated across social groups so that 1t=2t….=4t. This is a 
plausible assumption. Substituting in A3, the parenthesis in front of each interaction term then 
simplifies to (it + 1t- 5) with the last two terms now identical for all social groups. In our 
section IV.C simulations, we set the proximity gain to marginalized groups equal to the upper 
caste enclave effect, 5 which, by assuming this is an upper bound on the proximity effect for 
the other social groups, allows for separate interpretations of the proximity and oppression 
effects.  
    To obtain a clearer interpretation of the oppression/proximity effects, we substitute 
1h h h h hSC ST MUS OBC UC     in the fifth line of eq.(A3) so that 5 ( )t v hDUC   
becomes  5 ( )t v h h h h h hDUC SC ST MUS OBC UC      . This yields 
 
0 5 1 5 2 5ln( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ht t t t t h t t hY SC ST            
3 5 4 5( ) ( )t t h t t hMUS OBC        
1 ( ) 2 ( )
3 ( ) 4 ( )
t h v h t h v h
t h v h t h v h
SC DSC ST DST
MUS DMUS OBC DOBC
   
   
 
     (A4) 
5 ( )
1 1 ( ) 2 2 ( )
3 3 ( ) 4 4 ( )
( ) ( )
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t t h v h t t h v h
t t h v h t t h v h
UC DUC
SC DUC ST DUC
MUS DUC OBC DUC

   
   
 
     
     
 
( )t ht h v h htX        
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Eq.(A4) shows that the household group effects (α’s) are relative to UC household  and that 
the enclave effect (β’s) are relative to non-own group and non-UC dominated villages. We 
discuss interpretations below. For non-UC households only the sum of the proximity and 
oppression effects is identified. 
 
Interpretation of the estimated coefficients  
Equation (A4) is equation 4 in the main text with the only difference being a different 
notations for the coefficients (e.g., 1 5( )t t  in equation (A4) is 1t in equation 4) for 
convenience. Note that UC is the reference household. 
The coefficients corresponding to the household groups need to be interpreted taking 
into account that there are enclave and oppression/proximity effects. For example, consider an 
SC household, hence hSC =1 and the dummy variables for the other household groups are 
zero, i.e. 0, 0, 0, 0h h h hUC ST MUS OBC    . The income equation for an SC 
household is given by 
 
0 5 1 5ln( ) ( ) ( )ht t t t tY        1 ( )t v hDSC 1 1 ( )( )t t v hDUC    (A5) 
( )t ht h v h htX       . 
 
The coefficient 1 5( )t t  corresponds to the effect of hSC on income and is interpreted as a 
1 5( )t t  x100 percentage difference in income between an SC and an UC household living 
in a village that is dominated neither by SC nor by UC households, i.e. when ( )v hDSC and 
( )v hDUC  are equal to zero, (ceteris paribus). The coefficient 1t x100 is the percentage 
difference in income between SC households living in a village dominated by their own 
group, i.e. ( )v hDSC =1 and ( )v hDUC =0, and SC households living in a village dominated 
neither by SC nor by UC (again, the reference requires that ( )v hDSC and ( )v hDUC  are both 
equal to zero). Likewise, the coefficient 1 1( )t t  x100 is the percentage difference in 
income of SC households living in a UC dominated village and households living in a village 
dominated neither by SC nor by UC. We refer to the latter as the net effect of oppression and 
proximity for an SC household. The interpretations of the coefficients corresponding to ST, 
MUS or OBC households are similar. 
Concerning UC households, we set 1, 0 0, 0, 0h h h h hUC SC ST MUS OBC      
in equation (A4), which yields 
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0 5ln( ) ( )ht t tY    5 ( )t v hDUC ( )t ht h v h htX       .  (A6) 
5t x100 is the difference in income between an UC household living in an UC dominated 
village compared to an UC household living in a non-UC dominated village (ceteris paribus). 
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